THE CRISIS IN DARFUR: GENOCIDE OR CIVIL WAR?

Politics of Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa– Darfur

The Crisis in Darfur: Genocide or Civil War?

Harvard University

Darfur– Civil War

The Crisis in Darfur: Genocide or War? ©

Politics of Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa

Argument: Present the case that the crisis in Darfur should be primarily treated as a civil war, with international responses accordingly.

The waging of war was once a relatively clearly-defined concept. While civilians and non-combatants have always been targeted by pillaging victorious armies, defining the conflict – and the combatants – has historically been relatively straightforward. Even when armies haven’t worn uniforms or been readily identifiable by ethnicity or cultural origin, the line between military warfare and the intentional decimation of specific groups – genocide – has been apparent. There are clear examples of both: the methodical murder of Jews and other non-Aryans during Hitler’s reign was clearly genocide; by comparison, Sherman’s march to the sea during the American Civil War, despite it’s targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, was an act of warfare rather than genocide. These examples arguably point out perhaps the defining distinguishing feature that separates genocide from warfare: the intent of the action. Where the goal of warfare is military – and ultimately political – gain, the primary goal of genocide is eradication of a segment of the population. If this is an accurate definition, it quickly becomes clear that, in modern conflicts, the line between genocide and warfare – especially civil warfare – is no longer as bright as it once was. In the former-Yugoslavian Balkans, for example, the conflict arguably began as a civil war of Croat versus Bosnian versus ethnic Serb, but once the bullets began to fly, genocide became at least a secondary factor, if not the primary purpose of some of the warring parties. Nowhere is the distinction more blurred than in the seemingly countless conflicts that have raged in sub-Saharan Africa over much of the last half century (Deng 123). Fueled by post-colonial friction, the last vestiges of the European slave trade, and religious and sectarian conflict, Africa has become synonymous with bitter warfare in recent decades; Somalia, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Sudan are just some of the examples (Burr & Collins 82). The post-2003 conflict still raging in the Darfur region of Sudan is just the latest example of this phenomenon in operation, and like the other modern African conflicts, choosing the appropriate label for the violence – genocide or civil war – is difficult. Both sides of that debate can be effectively argued; moreover, there is unquestionably a genocidal component to the Darfur conflict (“Q & A” 445). However, closer examination suggests that the Darfur crisis is more properly termed a civil war, precisely because of the question of intent: the Janjaweed militias, with the support of the Sudanese governing authority, may be targeting Massaleit, Zaghawa, and other ethnic groups – but the purpose of those genocidal acts is to achieve military and political gain (Hertzke 16).

A key part of the evidence for arguing in support of a civil warfare versus genocide label for the Darfur conflict is found in the history of the region, and in the historical origins of the most recent fighting. As aforementioned, the deepest root causes arguably go back centuries to the era of European colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade; however, for purposes of this discussion, the history of the last century is both more relevant and more telling. Following centuries of conflict in the region, most often between Arab Islamists and the African population – and between specific sects of Islam – the British invaded in 1916 and established colonial rule: “Darfur remained defiantly independent until 1916, when it was decisively defeated and subdued” (Deng 54). As so often occurs in regions with centuries of conflict, the external influence of a powerful authority had a temporary calming effect; just as Tito managed to rule all of the Yugoslav Balkans with an iron fist, the British colonial authorities brought a cessation of sectarian and religious violence (Sidahmed 17). But just as in Yugoslavia, which dissolved as Tito’s reign ended, the Sudan returned to conflict as status quo once the British granted the colony nominal independence in 1956.

However, there was another geopolitical paradigm that maintained some stability in the region following Sudanese independence: the ongoing Soviet-American Cold War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, northern Africa was a quiet battleground of the Cold War, with both American and Soviet organizations seeking to dominate the region. The net result, once again, was to establish a sense of superficial order – to metaphorically separate ethnic, religious, and cultural factions that would otherwise be at war (Anderson 55). As Soviet influence in the region began to wane in the 1970s, conflict became increasingly apparent; in fact, most historians pinpoint the direct roots of the post-2003 conflict to early 1970’s strife between warring factions, and the early 80s famines and epidemics that raged in the region – both of which were arguably consequences of Cold War neglect by the superpowers (Makki 28).

The Darfur conflict – of which the post-2003 violence is arguably just the latest flare-up – in a conflict that has now gone on for more than 30 years, with the factions divided along lines that are not only ethnic and religious, but political; however, the current revolt and warfare, despite its genocidal overtones, is clearly internecine warfare between allegedly historically disenfranchised Arabs and ethnic Africans:

Dozens of ethnic groups inhabit Darfur, groups of Arab and African ethnicity who have lived peacefully side by side in the past. The majority is non-Arabic farmers of African origin. Among them, the largest ethnic group is the Fur. The Arab groups have complained of political marginalization by the Fur. The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa complain of political marginalization by the Sudanese government. Since the current government took power through a military coup in 1989, it has changed administrative systems and taken other measures that are perceived to be supporting the political and economic cause of the Arab ethnic groups. (“Q & A” 446).

In short, the struggle is a political one and thus a conflict of civil warfare; nevertheless, the ethnic and racial overtones cannot be overstates. The Arab factions, historically disenfranchised, have controlled the government for decades; the various militias are thus operating with the support of the government, and utilizing genocide as a weapon of warfare. Whatever the conflict is labeled, there is no question that ethnicity is important. “Ethnically, Arabs make up 39 percent and Africans 61 percent. Religiously, Muslims make up 70 percent and the rest are Christians and traditional believers. The central government has been dominated by Arabs and Muslims since the country’s independence in 1956” (“Q & A” 445)

This is primarily the argument of those suggesting that genocide is a more accurate label than civil warfare for the current iteration of the Darfur crisis; their evidence is prima facie proof that acts of racially and ethnically motivated violence are occurring routinely. They are certainly correct in one respect: there is no question whether genocidal acts are occurring, and the evidence of these heinous acts of sectarian and religious violence is indisputable. Since the uprising of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and other non-Arab factions began in 2003, the Muslim Janjaweed militia – with the full support of the Sudanese government – have conducted campaigns of intentional “ethnic cleansing” on a scale not seen since the 1990s crisis in Rwanda. As of 2005, the figures were already staggering: surveys placed the death toll caused directly by the violence at as high as 172,000; secondary effects, including malnutrition and disease, had killed more than 125,000 more. British governmental agencies put the total casualty count at no fewer than 300,000 people – almost all civilians – and almost 2 million people had been forced from their homes, most then living in squalid conditions in refugee camps (Bellamy 31). During the fall of 2005, the United Nations declared that it estimated that “up to 3.5 million people face famine in Darfur” (Hertke 20). With so much of the violence targeted specifically at civilians, and particularly because of the racial and ethnic nature of much of the killing, it is little wonder that many argue that “genocide” is the most accurate descriptive term for the conflict. In fact, “following a unanimous vote by the U.S. Congress in July 2004, Colin Powell took the unprecedented step of labeling the violence ‘genocide’” (Bellamy 31). In fact, Powell went on to clarify and confirm his statement:

The survey soon made its way to Powell’s desk. Shortly thereafter, he unambiguously told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the survey’s finding, saying, “We concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility, and genocide may still be occurring.” Powell’s statement constituted a momentous occasion for Sudan activists, one of whom told me he cried like a baby when he heard it. But while the statement may have temporarily satisfied these activists–a large number of whom, incidentally, are evangelical Christians, which may help explain why Powell made it seven weeks before the election–no policy shift accompanied the declaration. (Goldberg 16).

However, despite this declaration from the U.S. government and the ample evidence of genocidal violence, objective analysis of the political situation at the core of the violence demonstrates that genocide is a secondary effect, rather than the primary action; in essence, the Darfur conflict is a civil war, in which genocide is being used as a military tactic. Regardless of the racial and ethnic factors, it must be remembered that the post-2003 conflict actually began for political reasons – with the disparate factions in conflict because of warring ideologies; they may be identifiable by ethnicity or religion, but it is political power that is at the core of the struggle, as in any civil war. The current conflict was actually triggered in 2003 when African rebel groups rose up against the Sudanese government, demanding equality; two of the groups, the Sudanese Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, later merged with other factions and were explicitly demanding political and civil rights (Bellamy 36). The Sudanese government’s response was largely to support the Janjaweed militia, an ethnic Arab group of religious Muslims; they were basically drafted into service after the rebels routed government forces in early clashes. There is no question that in the interim the Janjaweed have resorted to “ethnic cleansing” type attacks on civilian populations, but again those calling it “genocide” miss the point: the attacks are made for political and military gain, not for the sake of genocide itself (Totten 440). “The conflict in Darfur, an independent kingdom annexed to Sudan in 1917, started in the 1970s as a low-key dispute between migrant Arab nomads and local African farmers over grazing lands in this drought-prone region. By February 2003, the dispute had turned into a full-fledged civil war” (Makki 28).

The point of the debate here is not to minimize the suffering of the victims of violence, but to maintain a credible model of genocide for use in future conflicts; to mislabel or misunderstand genocide carries a risk of missing the warning signs of a future holocaust. The African and non-Arab Sudanese are suffering grievously due to genocidal-type violence at the hands of government supported Muslim militias; however, genocidal violence does not necessarily equate to genocide, in either terms of international law or by simply logical analysis (Goldberg). Those arguing that genocide is the proper descriptive label for the Darfur conflict are basing their argument solely on the statistical and numerical data, rather than on a historical or political analysis: they argue ipso facto that because thousands have been killed, Darfur represents an episode of genocide in progress. However, this argument is specious; were it true, every conflict in which thousands died – or in which the warring factions were notably distinct ethnically or racially – could be termed “genocide.” A much more accurate assessment must focus on the motivational factors behind the violence: in the simplest terms, if “ethnic cleansing” is an end in and of itself, “genocide” is occurring; by contrast, those who argue in favor of the “civil war” label, suggest that where genocide is a tactic – a means to an end rather than the end itself – than “genocide” is not the proper label.

The latter argument is logically and rhetorically superior, and is supported by history, specifically in the case of Darfur. The Sudanese government is not aiding the militias in eradication of African Sudanese primarily for ethnic cleansing purpose; they are supporting the violence – and using “genocide” as a tactical part of an overall strategy – in order to quell a rebellion. In short, as governments in power tend to do, they are seeking to hang onto that power, by any means necessary. Therefore, at its core the Darfur conflict is rooted in a political power struggle; the ethnicity is a secondary aspect. Politically motivated conflict, taking place in a domestic arena, is warfare – civil warfare – by definition, and should be described as such, despite the heinous violence occurring as part of that war.

References Cited

Anderson, G. Norman. Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999.

Bellamy, Alex J. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq.” Ethics & International Affairs 19.2 (2005): 31-39.

Burr, J. Millard, and Robert O. Collins. Africa’s Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963-1993. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

Deng, Francis M. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institutuion, 1995.

Goldberg, Mark Leon. “Khartoum Characters: Exactly 142 Days after Bush Said the Word “Darfur,” He Added a More Important Word “Genocide.” but Does the Policy Match the Sentiment?” The American Prospect July 2005: 14-18.

Hertzke, Allen D. “The Shame of Darfur.” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life Oct. 2005: 16-22.

Makki, Sala. “Sudan: Darfur, More Than a Conflict; “It Is Genocide.” That Is, at Least, How Mukesh Kapila, the Outgoing UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Khartoum, Describes the Fighting in the Darfur Region of Western Sudan. Sala Makki Reports.” New African May 2004: 28-33.

“Q&A: Crisis in Darfur.” Social Education 68.7 (2004): 445-456.

Sidahmed, Abdel Salam, and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Totten, Samuel. “The Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project.” Social Education 68.7 (2004): 438-447.

The Power of Congressional Incumbency: How Unfair Electoral Advantage Damages American Democracy

Congress, Policy, Parties, & Institutions

The Power of Congressional Incumbency: How Unfair Electoral Advantage Damages American Democracy

Congress, Policy, Parties, & Institutions –

The Power of Congressional Incumbency: How Unfair Electoral Advantage Damages American Democracy ©

Abstract

The United States Congress – particularly the House of Representatives and its members appointed in proportion to state population – was designed as the branch of government that answered directly to the people. The federal judiciary, appointed for life to positions of great power, are largely beyond reach of the electorate, barring misconduct or malfeasance; similarly, the executive branch – the President – was created to wield executive authority, to be a leader and a figurehead, less influenced by changes in popular opinion. But the Congress was supposed to be different: the House of Representatives – and eventually the Senate, after 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution – is elected directly by the popular vote of the people, and was designed as a check on both judicial and executive power (Mayhew, 1974). Unfortunately, one simple electoral reality has significantly limited the U.S. Congress as a true “voice of the people”: specifically, the fact that incumbents are almost universally re-elected. The factual truth is that once an individual is elected to Congress – especially to the U.S. Senate – he or she will generally retain that seat as long as they wish to continue occupying the office (Fiorina, 1997). Going back at least a century, the single greatest advantage in any Congressional election was being an incumbent; that is, having already been elected once previously. In the 2004 election cycle, for example, the re-election rate for sitting members of Congress was a stunning 98.8%; as one writer noted, such an undemocratic, iron-fisted hold on the power of the status quo might have “made even Soviet politicians blush” (Radmacher, 2006). In fact, ironically enough even though the British House of Lords – one of the Houses of Parliament – consists entirely of members appointed for life, it nevertheless “has more turnover than the U.S. Congress” (Gear, 2000). In short, the power of Congressional incumbency functions to undermine the American system of democracy; it is simple common sense to point out that, if the sitting legislator is almost guaranteed to be re-elected, the election is de facto invalid. True democracy, in both the theoretical and practical sense, would require that, to at least some degree, all candidates compete on an equal playing field, with their election depending on how the electorate responds to their views, positions, and personal attributes; the inherent advantage of incumbency in Congressional elections is thus antithetical to the democratic ideal because it negates any true choice for the voters. (Merriner & Senter, 1999). The political and sociological consequences are clear – and so are the root causes: they include campaign financing, partisan electoral redistricting, media visibility granted to incumbents, and disparity in available funding; all of these must be addressed if Congressional elections are to be returned to their populist origins.

Uncontested and Uncompetitive Elections

As with all exercises in problem-solving, the first step in identifying workable solutions is defining the size and scope of the problem; and by any definition, the inherent and inherently anti-democratic advantages of Congressional incumbency are enormous. In fact, party leaders on both sides of the American political continuum are so well aware of the reality of the power of incumbency that firmly held Congressional seats are rarely even legitimately contested. For example, during the 2000 election cycle, political scientists noted that “out of 435 House seats, 64 members this year have no major-party opponent, according to the Center for Voting and Democracy. About 300 or so face only token opposition, according to experts and House members” (Weiser, 2000). The truth is that, on a state-by-state and district-by-district basis, for reasons that are both historical and political, the vast majority of Congressional seats are firmly held by one party – or by one person. In this states, or in those districts, it simply makes no sense for the minority party or non-incumbent candidate to make more than a token effort; after all, they are almost certain to fail. The data is clear: “Fewer than one in ten congressional seats were won by less than 10% in 1998, and more than 80 percent of districts could be certified as “safe” for one party a year ago. Voters in those districts will have no role in shaping the next Congress” (Mortimer, 2000). During the 2000 elections, “Rep. Tom Davis, R-Va., chairman of the national Republican Congressional Committee … boasted to reporters about GOP incumbents: ‘185 guys are back without worrying about it.’ Democrats put their number of untouchable incumbents at 190, said John Del Cecato, spokesman for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. That adds up to more than 85 percent of House members who are considered shoo-ins” (Weiser, 2000). The effect of this entrenched incumbency not only de-legitimizes the federal legislature, it also spills over into the Presidential election, and serves to effectively negate the votes of citizens in all but a handful of states that are actually contested:

The presidential election, of course, is actually 50 separate winner-take-all state elections. The candidate with the most votes in each state wins all of that state’s electoral votes. (Nebraska and Maine allocate some of their electoral votes by congressional district.) Most states are reliably won by one major party. That means that the only real way people in those states can help their candidate (aside from sending money) is to move to one of eight or 10 “battleground states,” like Michigan or Ohio, whose electoral votes will decide the election. (Mortimer, 2000).

The situation in the House of Representatives is similar; with the vast majority of races either non-competitive or barely competitive – with so many races barely even being contested by the opposition party – a significant number of the House elections simply don’t matter in terms of which side controls the legislature. “The struggle for control of the House centers on 20 to 30 competitive districts such as Lansing, Mich.; Montgomery County, Pa.; suburban Chicago; and a district around Muskogee, Oklahoma. The 200 million Americans who live outside the battleground districts are just spectators” (Weiser, 2000).

Statistical Evidence

The attitude of both major parties – the willingness to abandon most districts and states as non-competitive – raises an immediate question: is their basic premise supported by factual data? The unfortunate answer is clearly yes. Since at least the 1970s, re-election rates for members of the House of Representatives has never fallen below 90%; the figure has been the same for the Senate since the early 1980s (Merriner & Senter, 1999, p. xxi). The more recent statistics can only be described as stunning: in the 2004 elections, 401 incumbent members of the House of Representatives ran for re-election; of those 401 that sought to return to office for another term, 396 were successful. A mere five failed to win re-election. The picture is even bleaker in the Senate: in 2004, of 26 Senators up for re-election, 25 were successful. Just a single lone incumbent managed to lose a Senate race (“Why?). Obviously the attitude of party leaders that only a very few districts and states actually matter is well-founded; the question to be answers is what are the origins for this phenomenon.

Financial Issues/Campaign Finance Reform

Money is perhaps the single biggest reason that incumbents are returned to office so often, and their incumbency is actually the primary factor in their ability to raise funds; this sort of cyclical effect is the most powerful engine driving the re-election of incumbents in Congress. “It’s rare for an incumbent to face a challenger with a campaign war chest even half the size… Whoever raises the most money almost always wins. And incumbents almost always raise the most money” (Radmacher, 2006). This creates a self-perpetuating cycle: since the candidate with the most money usually wins, and incumbents almost always have more funds available – the incumbent has a distinct advantage. In 2004, for example, incumbents in the House of Representatives outspent their opponents by an average of $700,000; in the Senate, incumbents outspent challengers by an average of more than $4 million (‘Why?”). With those figures in mind, the fact that 95%-99% of incumbents are re-elected in any given election cycle is unsurprising. But the question then becomes: how do incumbents so reliably raise so much more campaign money – and the answer is invariably that they do so by exploiting the media advantages afforded to incumbents.

The Media Advantage

Another key advantage of incumbency is media exposure. First and foremost, easy access to mass media makes raising funds for election campaigns much more efficient – and the newspapers and magazines are eager to help incumbents get all the exposure they need:

Sitting members of Congress are almost universally recognized in their districts. Having waged at least one previous campaign, and a successful one at that, and then serving in Congress for two years (House members) or six years (Senators) makes a sitting member of Congress something of a household name among his or her constituents. Moreover, members of the U.S. House and Senate have easy and ready access to the news media and make regular appearances on television and radio programs and are frequently mentioned in newspaper articles and editorials. (“Why?”)

The result of this automatic media exposure once again creates a sort of cyclic pattern that almost ensures re-election. Incumbency leads to exposure from a variety of sources, particularly in more recent decades, thanks to the Internet and cable television. “Both House and Senate members lay claim to automatic media attention, increasing their exposure to their constituents. Given that most electoral politics is now played through the media this factor is of immense importance. In order to hold a modern campaign, most campaign spending is directed at media outlets. House members have the ability to appear, virtually at will, on the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN), which televises House sessions each day to viewers in some 17 million homes” (Walsh, 1984, p. 31). As a result of this exposure, the incumbent gains unbeatable name recognition in his district or state – that makes fund-raising almost automatic. The constituents already know the incumbent, whereas the challenger must first create that recognition before any voters will contribute to a campaign.

Perhaps even more important than the fund-raising benefit of the media exposure given to incumbents is the value of the exposure itself. Even if appearances on cable talk shows and C-Span and local media doesn’t raise money, it creates a level of awareness in the constituency that no challenger could possibly meet – even with unlimited funds. Perhaps the clearest recent example of this principle could be seen in the case of South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond. Although he was approaching 100 years old and clearly not able to perform his Senatorial duties, the “adoration” of local and state media made it virtually impossible for any challenger to unseat the long-time Senator. In fact, he was so heavily supported in the media that he hadn’t been required to actually debate an opposing candidate in more than 50 years! (Merriner & Senter, 1999, p. 63). These triple advantages of mass exposure, efficient fund-raising, and media support can essentially end any opposition to an entrenched incumbent, which is precisely why dozens of races go entirely uncontested by the other major party.

Re-Districting

A final advantage of incumbents lies in the power of Congress to re-draw the lines if their own districts, commonly referred to as “re-districting.” This power might seem minor at first glance, but in reality it can instantly ensure major party control of a district for decades. The reason is that lines can be drawn to include specific social or ethnic demographics that will almost certainly vote largely as single blocks; for example, a Democrat might seek to gerrymander a district to include more urban and minority areas, while a Republican might seek to include more rural or middle-class areas. Thus, there is once again a cycle in place that serves to strengthen rather than weaken incumbency: once elected to office, a Congressman can gerrymander his district to make it even more likely that he’ll win the election in the next cycle. In other words, “the parties get to draw the districts, which lets them choose precisely which voters will be allowed to choose candidates in November” (Gear, 2000). This “nearly universal gerrymandering of congressional districts to provide safe seats for members of both parties” is a particularly pernicious practice, because once the district is gerrymandered, it becomes politically meaningless; unless there are major shifts in demographics, the electoral outcome is virtually certain for that district (Radmacher, 2006).

Conclusions

These are the realities of the current electoral situation in American Congressional elections: because of financial issues, media saturation, and rampant gerrymandering of districts, incumbents almost always win re-election, with the elections themselves thus rendered almost meaningless. Solving the problem will not be easy, since any attempt at reform can potentially run into Constitutional protections of free speech. It is, for example, impossible to bar local media from extensively covering local politicians; for that reason, eliminating the incumbency advantage will never occur. However, reforms could be instituted, particularly in terms of campaign financing laws and fairness in media coverage, that could make some headway into returning Congressional elections to what they were designed to be – the voice of the people as they chose their representative leaders.

References Cited

Fiorina, Morris P. (1977) Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New

Haven: Yale University Press

Gear, John. (2000, Oct. 17). “Cash Won’t Turn Race for Congress; Want to Know

Who Will Win? Check Districts Partisan Affiliations.” Lansing State Journal.

Mayhew, David. (1974) Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale U

Press

Merriner, James L. and Senter, Thomas P. (1999) Against Long Odds, Westport:
Praeger

Mortimer, Lee. (2000, Nov. 15). “Elections Give Voters Too Little Say.” The

Progressive Populist, Vol. 6, No. 20.

Radmacher, Dan. (2006, Oct. 26). “The Advantages of Incumbency Stack the

Deck.” The Roanoke Times.

Walsh, Kenneth T. (1984, Oct. 29). “Why “In’s” in Congress are So Hard to Beat.”

U.S. News & World Report, v97, p. 31(1)

Weiser, Carl. (2000, Oct. 20). “For Most Incumbents in Congress, Re-Election is a

Sure Bet.” The Ithaca Journal.

“Why Are Sitting Members of Congress Almost Always Re-elected?” This Nation.

Available online at: http://www.thisnation.com/question/016.html (7 Nov. 2006).

The Inevitability of Globalization: Societal Integration Or Socio-Cultural Fragmentation?

Globalization & Terrorism

The Inevitability of Globalization: Societal Integration

Or

Socio-Cultural Fragmentation?

Harvard University: Government- Public Policy

Globalization & Terrorism –

The Inevitability of Globalization: Societal Integration or Socio-Cultural Fragmentation? ©

GOVT PUBLIC POLICY

Globalization can be either an integrating force or a fragmenting force. Discuss howhat is possible and under what conditions it tends to be one or the other. Which do you think will prevail in the future?

Globalization & Terrorism

Analysis of history – both from a broad perspective and via exploration of specific historical periods – suggests that economic and cultural globalization is a largely inevitably phenomenon. The growth of the human planetary population, as well as unimaginably rapid expansions in our technological capabilities over the last century, have worked together to effectively shrink the globe. In past eras, news from the other side of the world might take months to arrive; today it takes moments. In past periods, the majority of cultures never came into contact; today, multi-culturalism is an inevitable product of rapid transportation and computer-based communication. These contrasting realities have meant that, while globalization occurred in past societies – it wasn’t really a “global” paradigm. In the ancient period, when the Roman Empire stretched across Europe and Asia and North Africa, globalization did exist – but it was slow, evolutionary, and regional rather than truly global. As the 21^st century dawns, globalization has become truly global for the first time, and the consequences are uncertain. The cultural and political interactions of globalization have the potential to serve as an integrating force, ultimately uniting the human species under one global system of order. However, cultural and even tribal distinctions also breed conflict whenever globalization forces multi-culturalism. Ultimately, while globalization may yet be an integrating force, current events and historical patterns suggest that fragmentation will be a more likely future result.

One of the aspects most often omitted from any discussion of globalization is the realization that, contrary to popular belief, it is not a new phenomenon. As aforementioned, the Roman Empire of two thousand years ago provides a prototypical example of the inherent hazards of globalization; it can be argued that the empire’s expansion and assimilation of other cultures led to a multi-cultural globalization that ultimately fragmented the social fabric of the Roman society. Similarly, the regional globalization of Greece in the fifth century B.C., a period marked by Athenian expansion and the rise of Periclean democracy, ultimately led not to integration but fragmentation, as the city-states and multiple cultures of Greece eventually collapsed on each other during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (Pressfield, 2001). It might be argued that these ancient examples are irrelevant, because the civilizations of those eras lacked modern communication and travel capabilities. However, there is a much more recent example of globalization – on an actual global scale – that led not to integration but to fragmentation. That example appears during the late 19^th century and led to the greatest social disintegration in history up to that point – the First World War:

From around 1870 until World War I, the world economy thrived in ways that look familiar today. The mobility of commodities, capital, and labor reached record levels; the sea-lanes and telegraphs across the Atlantic had never been busier, as capital and migrants traveled west and raw materials and manufactures traveled east. In relation to output, exports of both merchandise and capital reached volumes not seen again until the 1980s. Total emigration from Europe between 1880 and 1910 was in excess of 25 million. People spoke euphorically of “the annihilation of distance.” Then, between 1914 and 1918, a horrendous war stopped all of this, sinking globalization. Nearly 13 million tons of shipping were sent to the bottom of the ocean by German submarine attacks. International trade, investment, and migration all collapsed. Moreover, the attempt to resuscitate the world economy after the war’s end failed. The global economy effectively disintegrated with the onset of the Great Depression and, after that, with an even bigger world war, in which astonishingly high proportions of production went toward perpetrating destruction. (Ferguson).

There seems to be a clear historical lesson here, a lesson that was as true during the Wilson administration as it was for the ancient Greeks – and which remains true today: namely, that there is a balance that must be precisely satisfied between the forces of globalization and the inherent powers of nationalism and cultural identity. It seems clear that we are once again entering a period in which we are approaching a tipping point – a point at which the world will either come together or fall part, politically and culturally. “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be–the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others” (Huntington 22). The great danger here is that even as we once again enter a period of history in which expanding multi-culturalism and globalization may create greater unity for our species, we are still proceeding as if we are unaware of the pitfalls of past such periods.

It is not necessarily inevitable that globalization will lead to fragmentation; however, current events suggest that will indeed be the end result. American global dominance and the current “war on terror” provide the clearest indicators. Like empire building civilizations before us, we are rapidly spreading out into new cultures and regions, expending vast resources to do so, yet we do not appear to be fully examining the likely long-term consequences:

We have to spend hundreds of billions more rebuilding Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries we’ve pledged to help. We’ll need to spend a bundle policing against terrorism around the world, even if other nations are pitching in, too. Helping Russia and other nations secure all nuclear-fissile materials will be a further major expense. Add to that the substantial cost of beefing up homeland security. As I’ve noted, exercising true world leadership is also expensive; it will require far more money, as well as attention, than we devote to it today. (Reich).

In effect, globalization is not just a global phenomenon but a singularly American phenomenon. Unfortunately, as world society becomes more truly global and our own American influence is felt more deeply on a world-wide scale, we are beginning to experience the same tribal, ethnic, and nationalist resistance to globalization that the ancient Greeks and Romans experienced; this is arguably the same phenomenon that led to World War I and the subsequent conflict. The “war on terror” and the Iraq conflict provide perfect illustrations. “Iraq has now replaced Afghanistan as a magnet, a training ground and an operational base for jihadist terrorists, with plenty of American targets to shoot at … The so-called Bush Doctrine that set the framework for the administration’s first term is now in shambles. The doctrine (elaborated, among other places, in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States) argued that, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, America would have to launch periodic preventive wars to defend itself against rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction; that it would do this alone, if necessary; and that it would work to democratize the greater Middle East as a long-term solution to the terrorist problem … but it is the idealistic effort to use American power to promote democracy and human rights abroad that may suffer the greatest setback” (Fukayama). This assessment is debatable, of course, but when examined from a historical rather than political perspective, the truth becomes clear: no matter how admirable or benign American intentions may be, the inevitable response is a resistance to globalization. In theory, there may be tactical and strategic decisions that could be made to limit this disintegrative nature of globalization, particularly as it relates to the war on terror; some commentators have argued that rather than have an “American-style” war, we need to focus on covertly subverting terrorist organizations – in other words, taking a non-globalist approach that minimizes American global influence as we advance our own policies and interests (Ignatius, p. A13).

In the final analysis, however, whether discussing globalization as a broad principle or as it relates to specific American policies, the simple truth may be that globalization inevitably leads to societal fragmentation. By definition, globalization necessitates accepting a global order over individual, tribal, and nationalistic impulses. The record of mankind suggests that as a species, we are inherently resistant to acquiesce to such a political and cultural order. With cautious strategic selection we may be able to diminish the divisive nature of globalization, although history suggests that in the end – fragmentation will prevail over unification.

References Cited

Ferguson, Neil. (April, 2005). “Sinking Globalization.” Foreign Affairs.
Available online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/ econ/2005/03sinking.htm (7 July 2006).

Fukayama, Francis. “After Neoconservatism.” New York Times Magazine.

Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/ magazine/neo.html?ex=1141362000&en=a6ab5b762c549c55&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (8 July 2006).

Huntington, Samuel. (Summer, 1993). “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3: 22-28. Available online at: http://www.alamut.com/subj/ economics/misc/clash.html (7 July 2006).

Ignatius, David. (August 25, 2003). “Strategy, Not Numbers.” Washington Post.

Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45136-2003Aug25.html (7 July 2006).

Pressfield, Stephen. Tides of War. New York: Bantam, 2001.

Reich, Robert. (May, 2004). “Radcon 3.” The American Prospect. Available online

at: http://www.prospect.org/print/V15/5/reich-r.html (7 July 2006).

Globalization and the United States: Positive and Negative Impacts on American Domestic Policies

Globalization & Terrorism

Globalization and the United States:

Positive and Negative Impacts on American Domestic Policies

Harvard University – Public Policy

Globalization & Terrorism –

Globalization and the United States: Positive and Negative Impacts on American Domestic Policies ©

The United States is seen by much of the world as the strongest supporter of globalization – in fact, as pushing it on everyone else. We often think of globalization as something that impacts “other countries” – though it has had a strong impact on the U.S. as well. Compare and contrast the positive and negative aspects of globalization on U.S. domestic politics.

While globalization – an historical phenomenon which might be loosely defined as the increasing disintegration of national boundaries in favor a global economy, shared culture, and worldwide political integration – appears by all measures to be an inevitable and unstoppable progression, the likely impact and consequences of globalization remains the subject of debate. What is not questioned is the assertion that there will be both plusses and minuses, and costs and benefits, associated with globalization. The benefits to less developed cultures and nations are clear: by sharing in the global economy, these poorer nations stand to improve their economic conditions and – hopefully – advance the political freedoms of their citizenry. Similarly, the benefits of lowered trade restrictions and lessened national barriers to cultural interaction and economic integration are equally clear for the world’s wealthier nations; for the United States and Western Europe, newly opened markets around the world create new opportunities for economic growth.[1] Correspondingly, for every positive impact of globalization there are negative consequences, as well the direct and indirect impact of globalization on American domestic policies is not yet fully apparent. As a nation and a culture, we are effectively surrendering part of our national sovereignty, with the hope that the benefits of globalization will offset any costs. While globalization is not a historically new phenomenon, it has never progressed as rapidly or dramatically as present– with so little understanding of the possible outcomes. Our willingness to choose globalization over national self-interest is almost unprecedented, and it behooves us to fully explore the impact on domestic policy before we have no choice but to accept the full consequences of globalization.

To truly understand the impact of globalization on American domestic (and foreign) policies, the historical role of the nation-state must be analyzed; perhaps more importantly, it must be accepted that to some degree, globalization represents a negation of the benefits afforded by nation-state politics. The concept of the modern nation-state can be defined as a sovereign political entity that governs a geographical region that is inhabited by a population with a shared sense of collective identity.[2] In simpler terms, the concept combines the idea of nation (a unified populace linked by heritage, belief, religion, or shared values) with the political construct of a state (centralized sovereign political power).[3] In the 21^st century, the nation-state has become the dominant system of political organization worldwide; the vast majority of the global population now lives in these nation-states, governed by a sovereign authority that regulates a constituency with a shared cultural and social identity. Increasingly, however, globalization is serving as a counter-balance to nationalism – which has both benefits and disadvantages. The nation-state and the forces of nationalism represent competing paradigms: on the one hand, nationalism creates cohesion of shared cultural identity, but on the other nationalism breeds conflict with other nations based on competition for resources. In a balance-of-power model of global interaction, the rules governing that interaction amount to a basic balancing test. In choosing national courses of action, each nation-state must weigh its responsibility to the welfare of its own populace against long-term stability in the global community.[4] For much of the early history of nation-states, interactions were decided by opportunity and power: if a nation had the power to control a natural resource and the opportunity to do so, that course of action was often chosen. Today, international interaction is often constrained by the power of the international community acting together, as well as by the economic and political forces of globalization. Thus globalization is working to harness the destructive potential of runaway nationalism; however, globalization is also a barrier to the benefits of nationalism – such as space exploration, technological innovation, and other activities pursued as national attempts to achieve comparative excellence.

Nevertheless, the benefits of globalization are lucid, both on a worldwide scale and as they impact American domestic policy. Around the world, the economic domino effect of globalization have strengthened the economies of poor nations, decreased poverty levels, increased attention to environmental concerns, and led to more frequent intervention in national-level human rights abuses.[5] Although these benefits have been frequently political, they have origins in the economics of globalization; in both the United States and in poorer countries “the economic benefits from the increased prosperity that globalization will bring through trade, aid, investments, and technical change” have had significant national and global impact.[6] Ironically, for those opposed to globalization, the economic benefits are actually felt more strongly in poorer nations, as the consequences to U.S. domestic policy have often been lost employment opportunities for Americans:

Once Singer gets to the economics of globalization, he is on surer footing. He notes, for example, that you can’t complain that nationalism is bad and then also complain that the World Trade Organization erodes national sovereignty. And he notes that the main effect of NAFTA, denounced by the anti-globalization left as a tool of corporate oligarchs, has been the creation of relatively high-paying jobs in Mexico. Half the point of NAFTA was to ship American jobs to Mexico, which is bad for American labor but great for Mexicans. “Any transfer of work from the United States to Mexico can be expected to raise the income of people who are, on average, much worse off than those U.S. workers who lose their jobs,” Singer writes. “Those who favor reducing poverty globally, rather than just in their own country, should see this as a good thing.”[7]

However, there have also been significant domestic benefits to globalization for wealthier nations like the United States. Lower trade barriers, increased economic interactions, significance increases in real-time communications abilities between international organizations, and more emphasis on international cooperation – all consequences of globalization – have served to strength the U.S. domestic economy.[8] Unfortunately, these economic benefits are offset by the fact that the U.S. is now operating under a massive trade deficit – a new and troubling impact of 21^st century globalization. In past eras, wealthy nations benefits from globalization specifically because new markets were opened for goods and products; today, globalization has had a net effect of increasing deficits.

Today, as before 1914, the U.S. economy is the world’s biggest, but it is now much more important as a market for the rest of the world than it was then… Whether to finance domestic investment (in the late 1990s) or government borrowing (after 2000), the United States has come to rely increasingly on foreign lending. As the current account deficit has widened (it is now approaching 6 percent of GDP), U.S. net overseas liabilities have risen steeply to around 25 percent of GDP. Half of the publicly held federal debt is now in foreign hands; at the end of August 2004, the combined U.S. Treasury holdings of China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan were $1.1 trillion, up by 22 percent from the end of 2003. A large proportion of this increase is a result of immense purchases by eastern Asian monetary authorities, designed to prevent their currencies from appreciating relative to the dollar. This deficit is the biggest difference between globalization past and globalization present. A hundred years ago, the global hegemon–the United Kingdom–was a net exporter of capital, channeling a high proportion of its savings overseas to finance the construction of infrastructure such as railways and ports in the Americas, Asia, Australasia, and Africa. Today, its successor as an Anglophone empire plays the diametrically opposite role–as the world’s debtor rather than the world’s creditor, absorbing around three-quarters of the rest of the world’s surplus savings.[9]

In short, even where globalization has the highest potential to benefit U.S. domestic policy – in the achievable growth of our domestic economy – the realities of modern globalization arguably leave the disadvantages outweighing the benefits. As long the global economy continues to result in a net trade deficit for the United States, American domestic policy will suffer as a consequence.

Setting the all-important sphere of economics aside, no discussion of globalization can be complete without significant mention of the other major result of decreasing national sovereignty – the rise of global terrorism, the war against terrorism, and similar conflicts arising from the clash between globalization and national culture or religious identity. The inescapable reality of globalization is that “the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.”[10] The resulting political, cultural, and economic benefits have been enormous – but so too have the costs. Specifically, the costs to the U.S. domestic economy and our own national policies have been unprecedented. The costs of the global war on terror, both financial and human, have indeed been very high. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, in January of 2003, the war on terror had already cost the U.S. government $65 billion; of that $30 billion was spent in military operations in Afghanistan, the rest on homeland defense and security in the United States.[11] If the cost of the war in Iraq is included as part of a broader war on global terrorism, the overall expenditure increases significantly. Following original budgets of $60 billion for the Iraq invasion allocated in early spring of 2003, Congress approved another $87 billion in October of that year.[12] As of January 2005, the military operation in Iraq had cost U.S. taxpayers $152 billion. By September 2006, the cost of the Iraq War to the American economy will reach an estimated $315 billion. Of course, none of these figures take into account the human cost in lives lost – nor the possible creation of future conflicts and new generations of terrorists.[13] These economic and human costs obviously have significant and often incalculable impacts on American domestic policy and the U.S. domestic economy.

There have been other costs to the war on terror ranging from unforeseen effects on the economy to a price we have all paid for curtailed civil liberties. For example, American corporations doing business in foreign markets now face significantly raised costs due to security concerns:

Companies that rely on global trade face increased risk, shipping delays and new costs from the menaces of terrorism and war with Iraq. The dual threats of terrorism and war may be able to achieve what the anti-globalization forces have not – a significant slowdown, even decline, in global trade and investment…. U.S. firms have adjusted to tighter security and new requirements at U.S. ports of entry since September 11. The start of war with Iraq added a new level of scrutiny to all cargo entering the country.[14]

Perhaps the most fundamentally damaging costs of all have come at the expense of our Constitutional freedoms, as the government has expanded its powers to deal with terrorism – in ways that often have at least the potential to infringe on the rights of all of us. Some civil rights activists argue that the “zeal in pursuing results in the war on terror is creating a ‘Darkness at Noon’ legal system in the United States. Suspects who can be coerced into guilty pleas are given a public show trial. Recalcitrants are declared ‘enemy combatants’ and shipped off to Guantanamo or held offshore on ships beyond the reach of the legal system. Even U.S. citizens are dealt with in this way.[15] These civil liberties issues are particularly troubling because in fighting a war to defend freedom, we are risking limiting the very freedoms we fight to preserve. There are few more explicit negative impacts on domestic U.S. policy than changes to our constitutional liberties arising directly from the negative consequences of globalization. Sadly and somewhat ironically, it must also be acknowledged that, while the “war on terror” and the conflict in Iraq are arguably direct consequences of globalization, failure in Iraq may serve to significantly slow the progress of globalization – at least as it pertains to American domestic policy. If the war in Iraq is lost or abandoned, “the idealistic effort to use American power to promote democracy and human rights abroad that may suffer the greatest setback. Perceived failure in Iraq has restored the authority of foreign policy “realists” in the tradition of Henry Kissinger. Already there is a host of books and articles decrying America’s naïve Wilsonianism and attacking the notion of trying to democratize the world.”[16] In short, the negative consequences of globalization and its impact on domestic U.S. policy may ultimately deprive us of the domestic benefits of the same global interaction and economic progression.

Barring a sudden reversal in globalization, perhaps as a backlash to changes in U.S. domestic policy, we must acknowledge the inevitable process and prepare accordingly. Globalization – and all of the positive and negative consequences it carries – is likely the inevitable future. “And therein lies a tale of technology and geo-economics that is fundamentally reshaping our lives — much, much more quickly than many people realize. It all happened while we were sleeping, or rather while we were focused on 9/11, the dot-com bust and Enron — which even prompted some to wonder whether globalization was over. Actually, just the opposite was true, which is why it’s time to wake up and prepare ourselves for this flat world, because others already are, and there is no time to waste.”[17] This is the reality: globalization is almost certain to continue, as technology increasingly renders national borders and national sovereignty meaningless. There will be no escaping the impact of globalization on U.S. domestic policy. As the dominant economic force in Earth, the U.S. stands to benefit enormously from globalization; however, to achieve those benefits, it is critical that we understand the political, cultural, social, and economic ramifications. A balance must be pursued and achieved between our national interests and increasing internationalism; our domestic policy must both embrace globalization and maintain the cultural and economic conditions that have led to our superpower status. Out-of-control globalization is as menacing a potential danger as unbridled nationalism, and our own domestic policy must be established to circumvent both dangers. In brief, globalization must be pursued as it furthers our national interest, rather than for the sake of globalization itself. Maintenance of constitutional authority, an expanding domestic economy, and more equality in trade relationships must be of paramount importance; if this is achieved, the net effect of globalization will be a positive one, both on U.S. domestic policy and on the global community.

References Cited

Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

“Cost of War – Notes and Sources.” National Priorities Project. Available Online

at: http://costofwar.com/numbers.html (11 July 2006).

Dinan, Stephen. “Senate Gets Iraq-Terror Spending Bill; Package Is $87 Billion.” The Washington Times 1 Oct. 2003: A01.

Dunnigan, James. “The Costs of the War on Terror.” StrategyWorld.com.

Available Online at: http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/ 20030121.asp (9 July 2006).

Easterbrook, Gregg. “Greatest Good for the Greatest Number: Philosopher Peter Singer Will Anger His Traditional Lefty Fans with a Clear-Eyed Account of the Benefits of Globalization.” Washington Monthly Nov. 2002: 47-48.

Ferguson, Neil. (April, 2005). “Sinking Globalization.” Foreign Affairs.
Available online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/ econ/2005/03sinking.htm (10 July 2006).

Flora, Peter, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek Urwin, eds. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works. Oxford: Oxford University, 1999.

Friedman, Thomas. (April 3, 2005). “It’s a Flat World After All.” New York Times

Magazine. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/ magazine/03DOMINANCE.html?ex=1153281600&en=4f6eac995d8c4800&ei=5070 (11 July 2006).

Fukayama, Francis. “After Neoconservatism.” New York Times Magazine.

Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/ magazine/neo.html?ex=1141362000&en=a6ab5b762c549c55&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (10 July 2006).

Huntington, Samuel. (Summer, 1993). “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3: 22-28. Available online at: http://www.alamut.com/subj/ economics/misc/clash.html (10 July 2006).

Michener, Roger, ed. Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies. St. Paul, MN: PWPA, 1993.

Roberts, Paul Craig. “Legal Costs of Terror War.” The Washington Times 30 Mar. 2004: A19.

Sparshott, Jeffrey. “Terror to Take Toll on Trade.” The Washington Times 21 Mar. 2003: C07.

Wenar, Leif. “One World: The Ethics of Globalization.” Ethics & International Affairs 17.2 (2003): 121-127.

---

[1] Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 14.

[2] Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek Urwin, eds. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works. (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 12.

[3] Roger Michener, ed. Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies. (St. Paul, MN: PWPA, 1993), 48.

[4] Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.), 19.

[5] Leif Wenar, “One World: The Ethics of Globalization.” Ethics & International Affairs 17.2 (2003): 122.

[6] Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 115.

[7] Gregg Easterbrook, “Greatest Good for the Greatest Number: Philosopher Peter Singer Will Anger His Traditional Lefty Fans with a Clear-Eyed Account of the Benefits of Globalization.” Washington Monthly Nov. 2002: 48.

[8] Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 89.

[9] Neil Ferguson, (April, 2005). “Sinking Globalization.” Foreign Affairs.

Available online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/ econ/2005/03sinking.htm (10 July

2006

[10] Samuel Huntington, (Summer, 1993). “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3: 22-28.

Available online at: http://www.alamut.com/subj/ economics/misc/clash.html (10 July 2006).

[11] James Dunnigan, “The Costs of the War on Terror.” StrategyWorld.com.

Available Online at: http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/ 20030121.asp (9 July 2006).

[12] Stephen Dinan, “Senate Gets Iraq-Terror Spending Bill; Package Is $87 Billion.” The Washington Times 1 Oct. 2003: A01.

[13] “Cost of War – Notes and Sources.” National Priorities Project.

Available Online at: http://costofwar.com/numbers.html (11 July 2006).

[14] Jeffrey Sparshott, “Terror to Take Toll on Trade.” The Washington Times 21 Mar. 2003: C07.

[15] Paul Craig Roberts, “Legal Costs of Terror War.” The Washington Times 30 Mar. 2004: A19.

[16] Fukayama, Francis. “After Neoconservatism.” New York Times Magazine.

Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/ neo.html?ex=1141362000&en=a6ab5b762c549c55&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (10 July 2006).

[17] Friedman, Thomas. (April 3, 2005). “It’s a Flat World After All.” New York Times Magazine. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/magazine/03DOMINANCE.html?ex=1153281600&en=4f6eac995d8c4800&ei=5070 (11 July 2006).

Aristotle Response

Justice

Aristotle Response

“The state is thus prior by nature to the household and to each of us.”

(Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1253a20).

DCE Aristotle Response

“The state is thus prior by nature to the household and to each of us.”

(Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1253a20).

JUSTICE

When Aristotle claims in the above passage that the state – the political and social collective contract which binds and governs a society – takes priority and precedence over the individual, he is succinctly summarizing the most fundamental tenet of social contract theory as viewed through the paradigm of Locke’s state of nature. At first glance, Aristotle’s position seems not only contrary to Lockean and Jeffersonian ideals of egalitarian self-determination; his position also seems paradoxical to his own views on the role of democratic freedoms. Aristotle notes explicitly that “Republican government controls men who are by nature free”; in other words, freedom is the natural state of man, regardless of his inclination to enter into social contracts that curtail his freedom in the interests of governance. But how can man be fundamentally free, yet simultaneously have his freedom superseded by the primacy of the state? The answer, according to Aristotle, is that the formation of the state involves a partnership of free men, in which the collective state comes before individualism, specifically in order to overcome the chaotic barbarity that is inherent in Locke’s hypothetical state of nature.

The key to understanding this seeming paradox is to understand the basic purpose of Aristotle’s social contract theory. It is not his explicit intent to denigrate the philosophical significance of the individual; instead, he suggests that from a broader perspective, social contact theory permits the ascension of the state over the individual specifically to protect the individual. As he notes, the state represents a partnership: “Every state is as we see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the political association.” The argument here is based on the balancing of competing goods that is at the heart of social contract theory – and which by definition serves as a counterpoint to Locke’s state of nature. In that hypothetical state of nature, the individual holds primacy. Thus, individual desires and motivations take priority over any shared or collective concerns. The inevitable result is anarchy, as each individual works for his own interests.

Aristotle argues here, however, that by entering the partnership of the state, by surrendering to the greater authority of the collective political organization, the individual is actually working more efficiently towards his own self-interest, in a way that by definition dismantles the Lockean state of nature. In that state of nature, the strong or the clever survive and the weak perish; the only imperative is personal survival. By entering into a social contract, however, the preservation of the broader society becomes the greater good – but not for the sake of society, but for the sake of the individual. Aristotle notes that only one who is more than or less than human can function outside of this social contract: “It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.” The implicit message is clear: each individual enters into the social contract not to give up freedoms but ultimately to retain them, to protect himself from the anarchy of the state of nature.

Moral Reasoning 22: Justice

Moral Reasoning 22: Justice

Is it wrong for law enforcement officials to use racial, ethnic, or religious profiling in deciding whom to search in airports, train stations, and subways? ©

Is it wrong for law enforcement officials to use racial, ethnic, or religious profiling in deciding whom to search in airports, train stations, and subways?

The question at hand represents a duality of thought that is at the core of western liberal democracy, and it is a question that – in one form or another – has arisen countless times throughout our legal and societal history. The question is simply this: where precisely does the proper balance lie between individual freedom and collective security? The present question has some specificity because it is related to current sociopolitical events on a global scale: the reality is that worldwide terrorism, particularly and specifically terrorism originating from an extremist form of radical Islam, has become a significant concern for every western democracy, a concern that embraces both legal principles and national security issues. The simple truth is that there are groups of people, allied by common political, religious, and cultural beliefs, that seek to do harm to Americans, to western Europeans, to Israelis, and to almost any society that does not subscribe to their specific strain of Islamic fundamentalism. This is the reality; without acknowledgement of this reality, no meaningful debate on the security versus liberty conundrum can be held. While the legal, constitutional issues involved in deciding whether in light of this reality to permit racial and ethnic profiling are complex and clearly debatable, the reality of the situation cannot be disputed without resorting to disingenuousness. Ultimately, however, the question cannot be resolved with a simple yes or no; instead, a balancing test is required, a sliding scale of how much death and pain we are willing to endure to uphold our freedoms, and how much liberty we are willing to sacrifice to protect ourselves and our society.

There is an apropos and often repeated quote, attributed to Benjamin Franklin, that attempts to frame the issue – but does so only with partial success. “Those that sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither,” Franklin reportedly wrote, but his premise establishes a false dichotomy; it seems to suggests that there can only be liberty or security, rather than the reality – which is that these must always be balanced against each other. Some measure of liberty is always sacrificed for some measure of security: everything from seat belt laws and speed limits to gun control and hate crime legislation all infringe upon our individual freedoms for the sake our collective security. On those issues, we have decided as a culture where the balance should lie, how much we are liberty we are willing to give up to protect our lives and our families. The only difference between those issues and the present issue is in degree and constitutional specificity; in other words, permitting governmental action that discriminates according to race is a significant abrogation of liberties – but it must be balanced against the equally significant benefit of protection from terrorists intent on chaos and mayhem.

The debate absolutely must begin with a realistic assessment of the threat. The attacks of September 11, 2001, are often referred to as a “wake up call,” but the reality is that these terrorists, almost exclusively Islamic Arabs or South Asians, declared war on the West at least two decades ago, and have been working to destroy liberal democracies ever since. There have been thousands of terrorist attacks, bombings, murders, beheadings, kidnappings, and assaults in the last quarter century, committed by Islamic fundamentalists, perpetrated against Americans, Europeans, and Australians. Just the list of the most well-known, spectacular and destructive of these attacks is deeply troubling: these include the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, the TWA high-jacking in 1985, the high-jacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the Berlin disco bombing of 1986, the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, the first WTC bombing in 1993, the 1996 Khobar Tower bombings, the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, the 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and the recent subway bombings in Madrid and London. All perpetrated by young male Islamic men, all fitting an almost identical profile – and these well reported cases are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. There have been literally thousands of attacks just in the four years since 9/11, committed by individuals fitting this profile. Are there terrorists that do not fit the profile? Certainly – but they represent an infinitesimally small fraction of the worldwide total; in fact, non-Islamic terrorists are insignificant, at least as far as attacks against the United States are concerned. The question then is clear: with this reality acknowledged, how do we set that balance between security and liberty?

In his essay titled “A Shameful Hypocrisy,” Colbert I. King highlights most of the arguments of those opposed to racial profiling as a counter-terrorism measure. But in doing so, he makes several predictable and logically fatal flaws. First, he clings to Franklin’s inaccurate dichotomy that the choice that exists is between having only security and having only liberty; he fails to acknowledge the truth that almost every aspect of civilized society involves finding some balance between different measures of liberty and security. Second, he fails to acknowledge the concept that racial and ethnic profiling would follow common sense protocols rather than absolutes: the reality is that law enforcement officers would simply be permitted to use race as one of the factors in choosing which individuals to observe, search, or detain; King seems to imply that racial profiling would mean that all Arabs and South Asians – and any that look like them – would automatically be stopped, when this clearly isn’t the case. Third, King makes the mistake of erecting several straw man arguments, positions that have clearly not been taken by those who support profiling, in order to exaggerate his own case. Finally, King’s arguments falter in that he fails to acknowledge that many of the Constitutional actions he opposes are already being taken – but for purposes he most likely supports.

King’s weakest argument is an attempt to turn conservative opposition to policies like affirmative action against their support of racial profiling. As King accurately notes, most conservatives argue that the fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental discrimination based on race – and that affirmative action should thus be unconstitutional. Ironically, it seems likely that King actually supports affirmative action and thus does favor racial discrimination – except in the cases of counter-terrorist profiling. But setting that aside for the moment, even if we assume that affirmative action is clearly unconstitutional, King errs in failing to note the difference in the government’s interest in discriminating in this particular case. He is clearly making a relativistic judgment that, both constitutionally and morally, promoting diversity is the equivalent of protecting society against massive terrorist attacks. This argument is specious at best: while the government may or may not have an important interest in promoting racial and ethnic diversity, it unquestionably has a compelling interest in protecting the security and safety of American citizens. As has been demonstrated time and again in American jurisprudence, where the government has such a compelling interest, constitutional protections are routinely set aside. First Amendment protections do not extend to speech that incites violence, for example; similarly, Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to certain cases involving hot pursuit or exigent circumstances. The same principle applies here: if the government has a demonstrated compelling interest – and it so clearly does – it can take any measures necessary to meet that interest, assuming they are the least restrictive measures possible. King attempts to use straw man arguments to imply that racial profiling is not the least restrictive measure possible: he suggests that all Arab-looking people will be detained, that ultimately this policy will lead to mandatory registration, even to forced wearing of identifying clothing. Unfortunately for King’s position, no one is suggesting any of these measures: all supporters are advocating is a policy that permits law enforcement to use racial appearance as one of many factors in choosing who to search.

In assessing the issue, however, the question that is asked is whether such profiling is “wrong” or not; here it is the question that is flawed. Wrong, how? Morally? Constitutionally? From a purely legal standpoint, racial profiling could be considered unconstitutional; it is indeed racial discrimination and thus is prima facie contrary to the fourteenth amendment – but then again, by that standard so would any of a host of governmental actions that consider racial status. Is it morally wrong? There is no question that racial profiling will inconvenience innocent citizens based solely on their minority status; yet that inconvenience, when viewed through a common sense perspective, seems rather minor when compared to the potential benefit to society.

The factual reality here is that law enforcement is seeking a policy that is practical, pragmatic, and based wholly on common sense; the current policy of ignoring the fact that we know exactly what the likely terrorists will look like is ludicrous at best and suicidal at worst. No one has suggested rounding up all Arabs in a way analogous to the treatment of the Japanese during World War II. All that has been proposed is permitting law enforcement to utilize common sense that a four-year old would understand: people are going to try to kill us, and they all look a certain way – and it might thus be rather wise to take a slightly closer look at people sharing those attributes, rather than randomly searching little old ladies in wheelchairs.

In his essay titled “It’s the Age of Terror: What Would You Do?” Paul Sperry notes these common sense arguments, emphasizing a reality that appeals to the compelling interest principle: he notes that while random searches may be politically correct and appeal to the less important interest in protecting diversity, they are logically not going to be effective – thus they are not furthering a compelling interest. He implies that by failing to meet this critical burden, the government is not only choosing politics over pragmatism, but actually being negligent in its most basic duties to its citizenry. One of Sperry’s most powerful arguments analogizes the issue to the manner in which insurance companies charge their clients: as Sperry notes, insurance companies discriminate every day, based on age, behavior, occupation, and other factors that contribute to the “probability of risk” faced by the client. This is discrimination in its purest form, but the insurance companies are forgiven because their motive is absolutely pure: they are insuring their own profit margin. Because their bottom line is, in fact, their bottom line, it behooves insurance companies to know exactly who is likely to face certain risks and who is not. The practical question to ask here then is simply this: how would an insurance company handle the issue? The answer is painfully obvious, and is again one any small child could grasp: the insurance company would assess the risks accurately and act appropriately.

Our government must do the same. There is no question here of abandoning liberty for security; instead, the only issue is finding the appropriate balance between the two. Law enforcement will not be permitted to unlawfully arrest those having a certain appearance; all they are asking is to be allowed to take that appearance into account when choosing who to search or observe. There is no question that there will be some minor infringement of liberties, but these serve a compelling interest, and the balance must be weighted – in a manner that is rational and appeals to common sense – in favor of protecting against those that wish to destroy us. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson is often misquoted as noting that “the Constitution is not a suicide pact.” His actual words making this point, from his famous dissent in 1949 free speech case of Terminiello v. Chicago, read as follows:

The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.

This is exactly the point here. Those opposed to minimal, non-intrusive, common sense racial profiling are indeed choosing doctrinaire logic over practical wisdom, and in doing so they endanger us all. The threat is real. 3,000 died in the last attacks, and if Islamic Fundamentalists had their way, it would be 3,000,000 next time. If we allow that next time to happen, then the real danger to liberty will become immense, because the common sense balancing test will be abandoned in favor of absolute security. The population will demand it. To protect both our liberties and our present security, it makes far more sense to institute a common sense policy of racial profiling right now.

Nick Maceus

Amartya Sen’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ of Famine: Assessment and Criticism ©

Abstract

Nobel-prize winning economist Amartya Sen’s 1981 text Poverty and Famines gained worldwide recognition for its espousal of a revolutionary “entitlement” based approach to identifying the causal factors resulting in widespread famine. Sen’s “entitlement theory” abandoned the conventional wisdom that famine resulted primarily from insufficient food supply; in fact, Sen argues in his continually revised theory that famine conditions arise largely independent of food supply characteristics. Ss support of this contention, Sen pointed to numerous examples – like the 1974 Bangladesh famine – in which widespread hunger and malnutrition occurred even when a local or regional food supply was abundant. Instead of focusing on supply, Sen examines the economic factors that erode the citizenry’s capacity to purchase food supplies; in other words, Sen asserts that it is the economic inability to purchase available foodstuffs – rather than a shortage of food – that most frequently results in famine. Thus individual and family “entitlement” to adequate food is adversely affected by overriding economic factors – leading to the obvious conclusion that addressing famine issues will require attention to general economic concerns rather than specific food supply issues. In the following discussion of Sen’s “entitlement” theory, his paradigm will be examined in light of several recent African famines, including those in Chad, Ethopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe – with the ultimate goal being to establish practical applications for Sen’s theories of famine relief.

Outline

I. Introduction

a. Thesis: Amartya Sen’s “Entitlement Theory” of famine causation not only explains the real-world causation and continuation of recent famines in Sub-Saharan Africa, it also points to potential solutions to both ending those famines and preventing future famines.

II. Explanation of the “Entitlement Theory”

a. Sen’s availability versus affordability model

b. Entitlement as a concept: food as a property right.

c. The role of government/society in protecting food entitlements.

d. Basic economic factors leading to inability to purchase basic food.

III. History of African Famine/Examination of Supply

a. Exploration of food supply status in recent African famines

b. Comparison of food supply status to economic realities.

c. Assessing recent famines via Sen’s perspective

IV. Sen’s Entitlement Theory – in depth

a. Elaboration:

i. Focus on why people couldn’t afford food versus food supply availability

ii. Potential government “safety net” role.

iii. Prevention:

1. Policies to eliminate local and regional economic exploitation

2. Creating “free food” entitlement

b. Criticism

V. Conclusions

Politics of Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa Amartya Sen’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ of Famine: Assessment and Criticism

The Politics of Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa

Amartya Sen’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ of Famine: Assessment and Criticism

The Politics of Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa –

Amartya Sen’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ of Famine: Assessment and Criticism ©

Introduction

Famine is perhaps the defining condition of all human suffering, an inability of a population to provide itself with that most basic of human requirements – food. It has always been one of the cruelest facets of the human condition, simply because the availability of food sources has always varied so wildly and widely, based on both economics and geography, as well as on technology and culture. In one country, people are well-fed and well-nourished; in a neighboring country, the people are starving. The causal factors can be as minor as climate change, a failure in distribution infrastructure, or a localized drought; the causes may be as major as a natural disaster or a large-scale war.[1] These vectors of causation may, in fact, seem relatively trivial; very minor fluctuations in climate and crop production, for example, can significantly impact a regional food supply.[2] But regardless of cause, observers of famine have traditionally attributed the most basic foundation of causation to the most logical concept: that the root problem was a lack of available food.

It is precisely this basic assumption that Indian economist Amartya Kumar Sen effectively challenges with his “entitlement theory” of famine. In fact, Sen was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics for his revolutionary approaches to famine, human social development, and the political foundations of poverty. While also well known for his “capabilities theory” of welfare economics, it was his “entitlement theory” of famine that was the primary basis for the Nobel award. In simplest terms, Sen’s theory argues that the root cause of famine is not a lack of food, but the presence of economic and social conditions that prevent significant segments of the population from having the resources to purchase food. “In his best-known work, the 1981 book ‘Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation,’ Mr. Sen wrote that famines sometimes result from distribution problems – like the ones many African nations experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s – and simple economics. ‘Famines can occur even when the food supply is high but people can’t buy the food because they don’t have the money,’ he said.”[3]

In short, Sen’s “entitlement theory” is nothing short of revolutionary, because it completely rejects the underlying assumption that famine is based on a shortage of food; instead, it focuses on economic inequities that limit the purchasing power of segments of a population.[4] The Indian-born Sen based his innovative theory on personal observation; as a young man, he witnessed the effects of devastating famine in his homeland. One of the key factors he noted at the time was that even a severe famine only affects a small percentage of the population; even in serious famine conditions, only 5-10% of the population is usually affected. However, this condition can then have significant negative economic and social consequences for the remainder of the population.[5] Even as a young child, Sen noted the direct relationship with socioeconomic conditions and the famine he witnessed; in fact, it might be argued that his first-hand observation, when he was young enough to be predisposed towards a food-shortage theory of famine, may have had much to do with the later impact of his economic “entitlement” approach. “Sen was a child in Bengal (now eastern India and Bangladesh) during the famine there in 1943. He remembers handing out tins of rice to the poor – and wondering why they could not afford to buy food in a year when supplies were not especially low. Eventually, he concluded that the prime ingredients of the Bengali famine had been unemployment, high food prices, and an unsympathetic colonial government. An important milestone for Sen was the realization that healthy economies are not just based on the behavior of individuals making self-interested decisions (as mainstream economists seem to assume), but also on ethical or social values that market theory simply does not address or explain.”[6]

Decades later, Sen’s work has formed the foundation for an approach to famine prevention that is almost the polar opposite of traditional perspectives, and idea that social conditions and economic disparities are just as critical as crop production and food distribution infrastructure. These theories are not without critics, of course, but they have served a vital purpose because they have allowed new questions to be asked regarding both the cause of famines and about ways to end current famines while preventing future occurrences. Where previously the study of famine was left to anthropologists and biologists, today they are studied by sociologists and economists – all thanks to Sen’s theoretical framework. “[H]is ideas have had a global impact. By the reckoning of a fellow economist, Sudhir Anand of Oxford University, Sen ‘has made fundamental contributions to at least four fields: social choice theory, welfare economics, economic measurement, and development economics.’”[7]

Assessment and Discussion: The Entitlement Theory of Famine

               Assessing both the theoretical and practical applicability and impact of Sen’s Entitlement Theory requires a thorough understanding of the economic principles involved. Even from a superficial perspective, the theory is far more complex than the traditional assumption that famine is directly related to the availability of food. According to Sen, economic geopolitics, social equality, representative social justice, regional economics, the degree of democratic representation in government, and the equity of employment and income, are all more directly tied to famine then the issue of food supply – and each of these issues is alone comprised of many economic and social factors. The citation for Sen’s 1998 Nobel Prize hints at the level of complexity involved in fully assessing his Entitlement Theory; the citation reads: “his contributions range from axiomatic theory of social choice, over definitions of welfare and poverty indexes, to empirical studies of famine. They are tied closely together by a general interest in distributional issues and a particular interest in the most impoverished members of society.”[8]

               The final line of that citation is critical because if Entitlement Theory is distilled down to its barest elements, it can be viewed as a perspective on poverty – what causes poverty and how to prevent it. At all times, when Sen describes efforts to combat famine, what he is truly addressing is poverty; the core of his Entitlement Theory is the view that the “entitlement” to food resources is what is lacking where famine occurs – not the food itself. In other words, conditions of poverty created in small percentages of the population lead to millions being unable to amass the necessary resources to pay for their “entitlement” to food:

In the 1980s, Sen wrote a book that attracted wide attention within the discipline, in policy-making forums and among the wider public. In Poverty and Famines, Sen challenged the view that related the occurrence of famines to sudden declines in aggregate food availability. The book, which begins with a series of lucid analyses of specific famines in the modern world, argued that food availability did not necessarily decline in situations where famine occurred; what invariably occurred was that the entitlements of people to command food, whether through the market or other mechanisms, broke down. The application of what may be called “entitlement theory” goes beyond the study of famines, just as Sen’s study of famines went beyond the narrow study of food availability and drew in factors such as the influence and role of the political Opposition and independent mass media in situations of famine and persistent hunger.[9]

The role of poverty is the key to understanding Entitlement Theory for one critical reason: if lack of food is perceived as the causal factor related to famine, the food supply will be the focus of prevention efforts; conversely, if Sen is right that poverty – unequal access to entitlements – is really the key, than resources are more appropriately spent addressing the underlying issues of poverty, economic opportunity, and social justice. Viewed from this perspective, focusing on the food supply can be analogized to attacking the symptoms of a disease, while application of Sen’s Entitlement Theory could be viewed as addressing the pathogen which actually causes an illness – an approach which is ultimately always more effective, from both an individual and collective viewpoint.[10]

It is precisely this emphasis on social conditions rather than they symptom of food unavailability that have led most researchers to adopt Sen’s approach and focus on social justice issues when addressing famine. In short, the issue is now viewed as one of economics and justice – with a particular emphasis on distributive justice. Sen is today viewed as “a development economist who has been conducting a relentless ‘internal criticism’ of concepts of distributive justice and equality over the past thirty years. Whilst retaining the form of a distributive theory, he has successively interrogated what it is which ought to be distributed more equally, to a point where the content is now closer to that of the politics of recognition and discourse ethics, than to that of a traditional theory of distributive justice.”[11] This approach represents a worldview diametrically opposed to the traditional perspective that famine can be addressed through improved food production and food distribution; in effect, Sen argues that food is itself almost irrelevant – since an actual absence of sufficient food has historically never been part of the equation where famine occurs. Even if there is a legitimate food shortage, that shortage is inevitably geographically localized; as Sen has repeatedly noted, “most famines affect only 3 to 5 percent of a population, and never more than 10 percent. They are usually confined geographically and by class.”[12] If this is accurate, the implication is clear: the problem is never actually a shortage of food – it is, at worst, a shortage of food in the local or regional area. This is common sense: after all, even when a raging famine occurs in northern Africa, there is inevitably a surplus in affluent areas like Europe. Thus, according to Sen, the causes of famine are two-fold: the distribution problems in getting food to the famine-stricken areas from those unaffected, and the economic problem associated with that small but significant portion of the population without economic resources necessary to access their “entitlement” to food. It is precisely for these reasons that application of Sen’s Entitlement Theory to famine prevention always focuses on both prongs – both the distribution problem and the economic conditions:

The Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen’s entitlement theory sees famine resulting not from the unavailability of food, but the lack of means to purchase or otherwise obtain food. Prevention is rooted in (1) global, coordinated public policies that control exploitive local and global market forces and that provide import of surplus food and (2) entitlements that allow obtaining food such as free food at distribution centers, money, jobs, education, and health care in at-risk geographic areas such as states in sub-Sahara Africa, South America, and Asia.[13]

Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate the economic and political ramifications of Sen’s Entitlement Theory is to explore a real world application of those theories to a historical event: the 1974 Bangladesh famine. Sen’s theoretical work on the Bangladesh famine was critical in establishing his reputation as a leader in famine theory, and it is often cited as the blueprint for his Entitlement Theory. “Part of his explanation of the 1974 Bangladesh famine is that flooding throughout the country significantly raised food prices, while work opportunities for agricultural workers fell as one of the crops could not be harvested. Due to these factors, the real incomes of agricultural workers declined so much that this group was disproportionately stricken by starvation.

His work undertakes not only hard economic analysis, but broader questions including whether the majority principle is the best way to make decisions and how can it best be determined whether poverty is increasing or decreasing. ‘Sen’s research has practical use in every collective decision making process,” said Mr Robert Eriksson, professor of sociology at the University of Stockholm.”[14] Sen’s description of the snowballing effects of the Bangladesh flood provides a prototypical example of the practical application of Entitlement Theory. It is important to note here that food shortage was never an issue; instead, a natural disaster led to changing employment conditions, which in turn led to disastrous economic deprivations for the agricultural sector, which subsequently led to a segment of the population being unable to pay for food – which then created famine. As is explained explicitly in Entitlement Theory, in 1974 Bangladesh food was never an issue – the issue was the inability of people to pay for available food. Sen explained the process more succinctly in this way: the “flooding significantly raised food prices, while jobs for agricultural workers declined. Because of this, the real incomes of agricultural workers declined so much that they were disproportionately stricken by starvation.”[15] In a similar fashion, Sen studied the 1943 Bengal famine – the famine he had witnessed personally in his childhood – and proved conclusively once again that plentiful food had been available. “By detailing the weekly arrivals of food grains in Calcutta, he showed that it was not a scarcity of food but the lack of money to buy it that caused the mass starvation. In short …’Sen showed that a malfunctioning market economy could leave millions dead.”[16] In the final analysis, Sen’s theory boils down to a single concept: that economics and politics is responsible for famine, rather issues of food production. Food is more than ample in most areas; but creating economic conditions in which even the poorest are able to pay for the food is proving politically and socially challenging, and is thus the root cause of all famine, with globalization having a significant impact:

The principal challenge relates to inequality–international as well as intra-national. The troubling inequalities include disparities in affluence and also gross asymmetries in political, social, and economic opportunities and power. A crucial question concerns the sharing of the potential gains from globalization–between rich and poor countries and among different groups within a country. It is not sufficient to understand that the poor of the world need globalization as much as the rich do; it is also important to make sure that they actually get what they need. This may require extensive institutional reform, even as globalization is defended. There is also a need for more clarity in formulating the distributional questions. For example, it is often argued that the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer. But this is by no means uniformly so, even though there are cases in which this has happened. Much depends on the region or the group chosen and what indicators of economic prosperity are used. But the attempt to base the castigation of economic globalization on this rather thin ice produces a peculiarly fragile critique. On the other side, the apologists of globalization point to their belief that the poor who participate in trade and exchange are mostly getting richer. Ergo–the argument runs–globalization is not unfair to the poor: they too benefit. If the central relevance of this question is accepted, then the whole debate turns on determining which side is correct in this empirical dispute. But is this the right battleground in the first place? I would argue that it is not.[17]

One of the key factors that is, by definition, foundational to Sen’s Entitlement Theory, but often either entirely or partially overlooked in other approaches to famine, is the effect of national and regional politics on the economic conditions which can result in famine. Simply put, politics and economics cannot be separated; the overarching political ideology in power controls the economic system in place, which in turn impacts conditions that can create famines. Amartya Sen is not only an economist but also a philosopher, and much of Entitlement Theory is an application of political philosophy to the economics involved in famine.[18] Sen argues prominently that liberal democracy is a key prerequisite to preventing famine; in fact, he suggests that non-democratic governments are one of the fundamental causes of the economic factors that lead to famines. Where true democracy exists, famines are almost unprecedented, because democratic government serves to stabilize economic conditions for the varying segments of the population. One of the fundamental tenets of Sen’s Entitlement Theory is that famine only affects the small percentage of any population not able to access their “entitlement” to food; in democratically-governed societies, that effect is largely removed, even for the lowest socio-economic classes. It is precisely for that reason that Sen’s first prescription in most cases is to advance the cause of democracy:

In much of his writings on poverty, famines, and malnutrition, Amartya Sen argues that Democracy is the best way to avoid famines partly because of its ability to use a free press, and that the Indian experience since independence confirms this. His argument is partly empirical, but also relies on some a priori assumptions about human motivation. In his “Democracy as a Universal Value” he claims: Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence …they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press.[19]

This reliance on democratic government for advancement of the beneficial effects of Entitlement Theory applications is the reason Sen argues that traditional economic measurements are invalid as famine predictors. He suggests that standard measures of economic health are useless in respect to famine because they assess overall or average conditions; they fail to consider the conditions of the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder. Thus, an economy – especially one based on non-democratic government – may appear robust based on national statistics, yet be susceptible to famine because of the overlooked conditions of the poorest segments of society. For example, “the former Harvard professor has said that economists must look beyond gross national product when studying a nation’s wealth because GNP ‘overlooks the fact that many people are terribly poor.’ Mr. Sen developed alternative indexes that also include factors such as income distribution. ‘We have to pay attention to the downside of what’s happening and not just the average, majority position,” he said. Economists agreed that the field has long been overlooked and that the usual indicators of a nation’s well-being are not enough. “Just looking at GNP or GNP growth for a country like India might not be a very good way to say, `Is the development plan of the country really helping people?’ said Jerry Hausman, economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”[20] Instead of looking only at broad economic indicators like GNP, Sen utilizes his Entitlement Theory to call for a system of analysis that explores conditions more deeply, rather than more broadly. He argues “that simple poverty rates—also known as ‘head-count ratios’ —are flawed because an ideal poverty index should not only indicate the proportion of people who are poor but also estimate the average shortfall of the poor below the poverty threshold, often referred to as the depth of poverty, and additionally the distribution of income among the poor.”[21]

In short, Sen’s theory rests on the supposition that restructuring the political and economic system so that all segments of the socioeconomic scale have, at the very least, a guaranteed “entitlement” to basic food resources, is the required first-step to eliminating famine. It is at this point that criticism of Entitlement Theory must be addressed, because there are innumerable complexities and ambiguities involved in such a major re-focusing of economic and political paradigms. It must be noted, however, that Sen himself argues that free market economies do not have to be entirely dismantled, or that capitalism must necessarily lead to famine; he suggests instead that while the philosophical changes involved may be major, relatively minor changes to the economic and political structures currently existing should be enough to limit the likelihood of famine conditions.[22] Nevertheless, misapplication of his theory, usually by critics but sometimes by supporters, lead many to assume that Sen is calling for abolition of free market economies; that is explicitly not the case.[23] Instead of arguing for abolition of capitalism, or even for redistribution of economic capital, Sen is advocating in favor of equality of access to opportunity. It is ironic that, although often declared a liberal – in the negative sense – by his critics, his philosophical position is more in accord with classic conservatism: “Such outstanding moral philosophers as Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen are not at all concerned with welfare, but with opportunities, resources, rights and capabilities. According to them, achieving individual welfare and happiness is the person’s own responsibility. The state has the moral duty to further the means to, and remove constraints on, the pursuit of happiness, but not to secure that happiness itself.”[24] Despite this fundamental misunderstanding on the part of some critics, in at least some cases it is the analysts of Sen’s theories that most explicitly explain the basics of Entitlement Theory; G.A. Cohen’s summation is perhaps the most succinctly accurate distillation of both the fundamental principles and the basic meaning of the term “entitlement”:

When I came to read the relevant writing, I discovered that the intellectual interest of the stated truism lies precisely in its practical implications. For, properly applied, it defeats the unthinking presumption, still widespread at least in countries where famines are unknown, that they occur if and only if, and because, food supply shrinks. In truth, the immediate cause of loss of access to food is, necessarily, the fracturing or withering of individual entitlement to it through wages, trading relations, personal production, and so on; a fracturing or withering sometimes, indeed, caused by sheer shortage of food, but often occurring in the face of continued physical availability of food, because of price shifts, vagaries of wages, and unintelligent or callous public policy. The identification of entitlement as what finally matters implies that (a) food shortage need not be pivotal with respect to famine (and—this is an empirical truth unattainable by armchair reflection, and one of enormous practical import—in several major famines it has not actually occurred) and that (b) whether or not food shortage obtains in a given case of famine, famine prevention and relief requires identifying, sustaining and repairing lines of entitlement whose decay is what actually causes death.[25]

Criticism of Sen’s “Entitlement Theory” of Famine

Despite Sen’s revolutionary approach to famine that focuses on political philosophy and underlying economic conditions – or perhaps specifically because of that focus – his theoretical perspective is not without critics. Most researchers in the field acknowledge Sen’s contributions, and embrace a multi-tiered concept that now includes economic and other factors beyond the supply of available food; however, many also suggest that there are at least three basic flaws in Entitlement Theory: these are 1) the absolute abandonment of food production concerns; 2) oversimplification of the social and political conditions in famine-stricken regions, and 3) implicit and unrealistic criticism of the capitalist economic model.

The first criticism points out that while Sen is unquestionably correct in concluding that food supply and food distribution cannot be the sole factors involved in famine, he has, in effect, gone too far in the opposite direction; critics suggest that while politics and economics may obviously play important roles, they are not the sole determinants. Clearly, there is some validity to this criticism: it seems legitimate to suggest that, in opposition to traditional models, Sen is now too quick to overlook agricultural or food production issues. For example, critics point to many of the recent famines in northern Africa, which they argue resulted not only from conditions of civil warfare and governmental mismanagement, but primarily occurred as a result of droughts and other climatic conditions.[26] A review of Sen’s discussions on these and other famines suggests that there maybe some validity to this criticism; where earlier experts would have immediately jumped to food production and natural climate concerns, it does seem that Sen leaps first to political and economic issues – that he is predisposed to begin his analysis in that area, rather than stepping back and taking a broader, holistic approach. This is not to suggest that Sen is universally opposed to the idea of non-economic considerations being involved in famine, but that he does seem to focus almost solely on other concerns – even when economic and political conditions might not be the primary causal factor. Objective consideration suggests that, for this reason, Sen’s Entitlement Theory is probably most applicable when utilized as part of a broad spectrum approach to famine analysis, rather than being used as the only analytical tool.

Another commonly repeated criticism of Entitlement Theory is the argument that, at least in real-world application, it tends to significantly oversimplify the complex political issues involved in creating the requisite economic conditions for famine. An illustrative example of this criticism is provided by Caf Dowlah writing in the International Journal of Social Welfare, regarding Sen’s analysis of the 1974 Bangladesh famine. Dowlah “criticises Sen for not giving a full empirical account of the socio-political situation, primarily the widespread corruption in Bangladesh at the time of the famine in question … and that by neglecting to give substantial treatment to the wide-spread corruption in Bangladesh Sen had trivialized the conditions of the population.”[27] This is typical of this angle of criticism against Sen’s “entitlement” approach to famine: that it invariably fails to consider some critical political or economic element, thus by extension trivializing important data which might represent the key to ending the current famine or preventing future famines. Assessing this criticism is difficult, because the reality is that, by definition, the sociopolitical, geopolitical, cultural, and economic conditions involved are always going to be inherently complex. It is undeniable that one of the weaknesses of Sen’s theory is that it will inevitably neglect some important political or economic variable in seeking to define the root causes of a particular famine; this is simply inescapable. But simultaneously this is the theory’s great strength, as well: ironically, it is the traditional model – which focuses solely on food production and food supply – which is fatally simplistic. Entitlement Theory at least attempts to take into account all variables; food supply models ignore the root causes, favoring the symptoms over the disease itself. In short, while the criticism is accurate, it fails to recognize that Sen’s theory, while less than perfect in this regard, is still immeasurably superior to a paradigm which ignores the political and economic complexities.

The final criticism – which is perhaps the most frequently encountered and most vocally expressed – is that what Sen suggests with Entitlement theory amounts to a rebuke of capitalist democracy, that the only way his theoretical model can have real world application is if capitalism is replaced with quasi-socialism or some other leftist governmental model. Unlike the other two primary criticisms, this one is largely unfair; it basically represents a misunderstanding of Sen’s philosophy. While there are elements of Entitlement Theory that seem anti-capitalist, this is a superficial analysis, at best; in reality, Sen’s philosophy is not only anti-democratic, it relies on a free market and democratic economy. He is simply suggesting a new emphasis on shared access to resources and equal opportunity to the most basic entitlements. He answers his own critics most effectively in this regard:

However, can those less-well-off groups get a better deal from globalized economic and social relations without dispensing with the market economy itself? They certainly can. The use of the market economy is consistent with many different ownership patterns, resource availabilities, social opportunities, and rules of operation (such as patent laws and antitrust regulations). And depending on these conditions, the market economy would generate different prices, terms of trade, income distribution, and, more generally, diverse overall outcomes. The arrangements for social security and other public interventions can make further modifications to the outcomes of the market processes, and together they can yield varying levels of inequality and poverty. The central question is not whether to use the market economy. That shallow question is easy to answer, because it is hard to achieve economic prosperity without making extensive use of the opportunities of exchange and specialization that market relations offer. [28]

Ultimately, there is some validity to all three major criticisms; in addition, there are other aspects of Entitlement Theory that leave the model inadequate for some conditions. However, none of the criticisms override the major benefit of the theory: namely, that it attacks the root cause of the conditions that lead to famine, rather than addressing solely the resulting hunger – and as a result, may lead to a future with less famine, because of resulting changes to national and international political and economic systems.

Conclusions

Famine is a deplorable condition, arguably at any time in human history, but particular now, when it is entirely avoidable. Despite the criticisms of Sen’s theory, some of which are valid, the reality is that widespread hunger can no longer be considered a function of a shortage of food. In the 21^st century, even if food is indeed unavailable in a specific region, we have the resources to supply food from other areas. There is no reason this cannot happen – unless there are prevailing political or economic conditions which prevent it – and that is precisely Sen’s point. This was equally clear in 1999, shortly after Sen won his Nobel Prize, as Payal Sampat notes: “Sen’s work pushes economists and policymakers to respond to human needs that markets usually ignore. We have already seen what can happen when such needs are chronically neglected. The Bengali famine killed nearly 3 million people. And in many developing countries, purely market-driven policies may be setting the stage for social disasters of one form or another. This year, for example, Indonesia exported 4 million tons of rice – despite the fact that the country has just suffered its worst drought in 50 years, and 40 million Indonesians are undernourished. Market values aren’t what is driving the response to Hurricane Mitch. They shouldn’t be the primary policy tools in places like Indonesia either.”[29] Sampat is unmistakably right: market conditions aren’t causing food shortages, and should not be used as an excuse for famine; in fact, if Sen is right, addressing market conditions that may create the unfavorable economic conditions which in turn deny poorer members of society their basic entitlement rights is exactly the place to start in battling famine.

The world is rich enough and technologically advanced enough so that famine should be a thing of the past. Sadly, the facts are stark enough. Despite the widespread opulence and the unprecedented high real income per head in the world, millions of people die prematurely and abruptly from intermittent famines, and a great many million more die every year from endemic undernourishment and deprivation across the globe. Further, hundreds of millions lead lives of persistent insecurity and want.”[30] In a world with more than enough food, with some countries exponentially richer than others, it is impossible to blame an inadequate food supply for famine conditions; instead, it is painfully obvious that politics and political economics are largely to blame. This does not mean that food supply is never an issue, or that distribution factors may not be involved, but the reality is clear: where people are starving, there is a basic problem of political inequity and poor economic management. Despite the complexities involved, Sen’s theory has one basic message: when examining the reasons why people are dying of starvation in a world full of food, begin at the most basic levels of politics and economics. Only by addressing these root causes, can future generations be saved from starvation.

References Cited

Alkire, Sabina. Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

“Amartya Sen’s Unequal World.” New Left Review a.203 (1994): 117-129.

Basu, K. P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Bojer, Hilde. Distributional Justice: Theory and Measurement. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Blunden, Andy. “Amartya Sen on Well-Being and Critical Voice: The Critique of Distributive Justice.” August 2004. Available online at: http:// http://www.werple.net.au/~andy/works/sen-critical-voice.htm (24 Nov. 2006).

Cling, Jean-Pierre, Mireille Razafindrakoto, and François Roubaud, eds. New International Poverty Reduction Strategies. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Demartino, George. Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical Objections and Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism. London: Routledge, 2000.

Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen, eds. The Political Economy of Hunger. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Guha, Abhijit. “The Darwinian View of Progress: Comment on Sen.” Population and Development Review 20.4 (1994): 861-882.

Iceland, John. Poverty in America: A Handbook. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.

“Indian Wins Economics Prize; Expert’s Nobel Cause to Prevent Famine.” The Birmingham Post (England) 15 Oct. 1998: 10.

Leviton, Daniel. Famine. Available online at: http://www.deathreference.com/ En-Gh/Famine.html (25 Nov. 2006).

Mukhopadhaya, Pundarik, and Srikanta Chatterjee. “Unfashionable Economics Selected Contributions of Amartya K. Sen: 1998 Economics Nobel Laureate.” New Zealand Economic Papers 34.1 (2000): 25.

Myhrvold-Hanssen, Thomas L. “Democracy, News Media, and Famine

Prevention: Amartya Sen and The Bihar Famine of 1966-67.” Feb. 2003. Available online at: http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:dEtihAwhr34J: http://www.sasnet.lu.se/disasterpaper.pdf+Amartya+sen+famine+entitlement+theory+critique&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4 (20 Nov. 2006)

Nussbaum, Martha, and Amartya Sen, eds. The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Peffer, Rodney G. “World Hunger, Moral Theory and Radical Rawlsianism.” International Journal of Politics and Ethics 3.1 (2003): 45-57.

Pisik, Betsy. “Food for Thought: Economics Nobel Goes to Famine Researcher.” The Washington Times 15 Oct. 1998: 8.

Ramachandran, V.K. “Nobel Prize for a Great Economist.” Frontline. Vol. 15 :: No. 22: Oct. 24 – Nov. 06, 1998. Available online at: http:// http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1522/15220040.htm (26 Nov. 2006).

Sampat, Payal. “Sen and Sensibility.” World Watch Jan.-Feb. 1999: 2.

Sen, Amartya. “How to Judge Globalism: Global Links Have Spread Knowledge and Raised Average Living Standards. but the Present Version of Globalism Needlessly Harms the World’s Poorest.” The American Prospect 1 Jan. 2002: 2-8.

Sen, Amartya. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

“Sen-Sational Economist.” The Wilson Quarterly Summer 2001: 86.

Sohiberg, Peter. “Amartya Sen’s Entitlement Approach: Empirical Statement or Conceptual Framework?” International Journal of Social Welfare. 2006: Vol. 15: 357–362.

---

[1] John Iceland, Poverty in America: A Handbook. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,

2003), 19.

[2] Jean-Pierre Cling, Mireille Razafindrakoto, and François Roubaud, eds. New International

Poverty Reduction Strategies (New York: Routledge, 2003). 131.

[3] Betsy Pisik, “Food for Thought: Economics Nobel Goes to Famine Researcher.” The Washington

Times 15 Oct. 1998: 8.

[4] “Amartya Sen’s Unequal World.” New Left Review a.203 (1994): 117.

[5] Hilde Bojer, Distributional Justice: Theory and Measurement (New York: Routledge, 2003), 49.

[6] Payal Sampat, “Sen and Sensibility.” World Watch Jan.-Feb. 1999: 2.

[7] “Sen-Sational Economist.” The Wilson Quarterly Summer 2001: 86.

[8] Pundarik Mukhopadhaya and Srikanta Chatterjee. “Unfashionable Economics Selected

Contributions of Amartya K. Sen: 1998 Economics Nobel Laureate.” New Zealand Economic

Papers 34.1 (2000): 25.

[9] Ramachandran, V.K. “Nobel Prize for a Great Economist.” Frontline. Vol. 15: No. 22 :: Oct. 24- Nov. 06, 1998. Available online at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1522/15220040.htm (26 Nov. 2006).

[10] George Demartino, Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical Objections and Policy

Alternatives to Neoliberalism (London: Routledge, 2000), 82.

[11] Blunden, Andy. “Amartya Sen on Well-Being and Critical Voice: The Critique of Distributive

Justice.” August 2004. Available online at: http:// http://www.werple.net.au/~andy/works/sen-

critical-voice.htm (24 Nov. 2006).

[12] Pisik, 8.

[13] Daniel Leviton, Famine. Available online at: http://www.deathreference.com/ En-

Gh/Famine.html (25 Nov. 2006).

[14] “Indian Wins Economics Prize; Expert’s Nobel Cause to Prevent Famine.” The Birmingham Post

(England) 15 Oct. 1998: 10.

[15] Pisik, 8.

[16] “Sen-Sational Economist.” The Wilson Quarterly Summer 2001: 86.

[17] Amartya Sen, “How to Judge Globalism: Global Links Have Spread Knowledge and Raised

Average Living Standards. but the Present Version of Globalism Needlessly Harms the World’s

Poorest.” The American Prospect 1 Jan. 2002: 4-5.

[18] “Indian,” 10.

[19] Myhrvold-Hanssen, Thomas L. “Democracy, News Media, and Famine Prevention: Amartya Sen and The Bihar Famine of 1966-67.” Feb. 2003. Available online at:http://72.14.209.104/ search?q=cache:dEtihAwhr34J:www.sasnet.lu.se/disasterpaper.pdf+Amartya+sen+famine+entitlement+theory+critique&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4 (20 Nov. 2006)

[20] Pisik, 8.

[21] Iceland, 30.

[22] Sen, “How to Judge Globalism,” 6.

[23] Sampat, 2.

[24] Bojer, 2.

[25] “Amartya Sen’s Unequal World.” New Left Review a.203 (1994): 126.

[26] Demartino, 88.

[27] Sohiberg, Peter. “Amartya Sen’s Entitlement Approach: Empirical Statement or Conceptual

Framework?” International Journal of Social Welfare. 2006: Vol. 15: 358.

[28] Sen, “How to Judge Globalism,” 6.

[29] Sampat, 2.

[30] Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, eds. The Political Economy of Hunger. Vol. 2. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1990), 1.

The 21st Century Republicanism Movement and the Radical Christian Right: The Prodigal Relationship between Monolithic Politics and Organized Religion

The Bible & Politics

The 21st Century Republicanism Movement and the

Radical Christian Right:

The Prodigal Relationship between Monolithic Politics and Organized Religion

The Bible & Politics –

Conservative Republicanism and the Ascension of the Christian Right: The Evolution of Partisan Political Activism within American Christianity ©

Abstract

An in-depth exploration of the development of the modern relationship between the Republican Party – or more precisely far right conservative elements within the party – and significant segments of the equally conservative fundamentalist Christian movement within the United States. Primarily, during the last-quarter century, beginning with the election of Ronald Reagan the birth of Moral Majority activism. The analysis consists primarily of a three-pronged approach:

1. A historical and sociological dissection of the cultural and political forces that led to the rise of the Christian Right within the Republican Party; including where and how Christian fundamentalism has become inextricably intertwined with neo-conservative politics; including earlier historical perspective on the role of religion in early American politics;

1. An objective analysis of the effects and consequences of this relationship – both good and bad – on both modern American society and on our national and regional political system , and

1. An attempt to query the ways in which moderate Republicans, Independents, and Democrats can work to counter the more pernicious effects of this increasingly detrimental confluence of influence between Fundamentalist Christians and conservative Republicans.

Historical context is applied, to better understand the role of religion in American politics. As the research makes clear, religion has always – to varying degrees – had an impact on partisan politics in the United States, with the church being heavily involved with different issues during different periods. However, the current relationship between the Far Right and Christian Fundamentalism is a new – and frankly disturbing – phenomenon. Specifically, although religion and politics have always been interrelated in the United States, this is the first time that it has been so singularly contained within a single wing of one party; moreover, this is the first time that a religious movement has largely taken over a political party (or a significant part of that party) in a way that leads to real-world influence on critical domestic and international policies. In other words, while preachers and pastors have always voiced their political opinions – this is the first time that its been confined to one party, the first time its begun to largely control one party, and certainly the first time that a single religion has had so much direct control, within both that party and within the government as a whole.

The project is not intended as a partisan hit-piece on conservatism or Republicanism; instead, it is envisioned as an exploration of a troubling phenomenon within the Republican Party, which frankly runs counter to constitutional church/state separation, and which may have negative consequences for all Americans. The research concludes with pragmatic solutions for a response, both from moderate Republicans and from Democrats, that may serve to weaken the relationship between the Christian Right and Republicans – or at least push that relationship in a direction that is more governmentally and ideologically sound, for all Americans.

Introduction

To modern political observers, the inextricably intertwined relationship between politics and religion – at least in American politics – may seem inescapable and inevitable; the reality, however, is that this is a relatively new phenomenon. Perhaps not from a generalist perspective: from a broad-based viewpoint, religion has always been a cornerstone of political ideology. Religion has spurred change and shaped culture; in fact, there is a fundamentally sound argument that the most basic tenets of American political and constitutional governance are based in Judeo-Christian ethics (Lubet, 1998). But historically, this interplay between organized religion and politics has been constrained by constitutional interpretations of the First Amendment calling for a separation between church and state, and – more importantly – it has not been narrowly focused on a single political party and a narrow segment of the electorate. In other words, prior to the current era, where religion was a part of public life, it was equally significant in both all major political parties and with most candidates, regardless of ideology (Moen, 1992, p. 44). Thus, throughout most of American history and continuing as late as the 1960s, religion and the tenets of religion – specifically morality, ethics, “family values,” and traditional culture – were equally associated with both Democrats and Republicans (or with other major parties, in earlier historical periods). The modern paradigm, in which a single party – the Republican Party – is closely aligned with organized religion in general and fundamentalist Evangelical Christianity in particular – is actually a historically recent phenomenon, dating to no earlier than 1970, and perhaps most explicitly attributable to the 1980 election of President Ronald Reagan (Wilcox, 1990).

This point is critical because it underline and emphasizes both were the key problem is found – and where it is not found. The focus of the discussion is not on whether organized religion of any sort or Evangelical Protestantism specifically are net negative or positive forces in culture and society; while such a debate may be valid, it misses the key context of the current political environment. Nor should the discussion focus on the role of religion in public life. Once again, there is a valid debate to be had on the subject of whether – and to what extent, if any – religion and faith should influence governmental action and public policy. However, the critical issue here is instead the impact of a single monolithic party – the modern conservative and neoconservative Republican Party – being almost singularly linked to religion, to a specific version of Christianity. In the 21^st century, the Republican Party is so closely linked with Christian activist organizations that the two entities seem virtually inseparable – and it is here that the discussion must be focused, because this relationship must, by necessity, have significant impacts on public policy. Where previously, both parties could lay claim to religion, today to be Christian is largely to be Republican; non-Christians are viewed skeptically by many Republicans, and many organized churches reject liberal and Democratic members, either implicitly or overtly (Huang, 2003). Thus, the Republican Party can use the power of religion to recruit new voters – while at the same time, the Christian Right has gained enormous power to influence policy choices made by Republican legislators and executives. In short, by becoming almost solely the province of a single party, the American Christian Right has both become a key constituency of that party and gained enormous power to influence national and international policy (Penning & Smidt, 1997).

The important point here is simple: the relationship between Republicanism and Evangelical Christianity has created a political situation in which a relatively small minority wields disproportionate power to influence policy. The argument is not that religion of any type – specifically including Evangelical Protestantism – is necessarily undesirable, or that it should be entirely segregated from public life; nor is the argument that conservatism or Republicanism is necessarily ideologically lacking on specific issues. Instead, the question to be raised is whether this singularly powerful bond between religion and one major party represents a potential for abuses of power. At the end of the day, power is, in fact, the most basic issue: the current situation has created both a power vacuum and a power locus, giving undue influence to the Christian Right – in a way that affects all Americans. An examination of the history of the rise of the modern Christian Right and the current state of the relationship between Evangelical Christianity and the Republican Party lead to three main arguments: 1) that the Christian Right today has significant impact on both the ideological direction of the conservative movement with the Republican Party and the governmental actions of Republican officials, 2) that the Christian Right is now one of the most effective advocacy organizations in the history of American politics, having an enormous impact on electoral outcomes, primarily because they can motivate Christians (and in some cases non-Christians) to vote based on religious and moral authority rather than ideological or public policy concerns, and 3) that these factors have given the Christian Right significant power to influence policy for all Americans – and that so much power in the hands of so few is inherently dangerous.

The Rise of the Modern Christian Right in America

Like most fundamentalist movements, the modern Christian Right and its ties to the Republican Party began as a counter-movement to another political insurgence: the 1960s birth of secular liberalism. Thus, the Religious Right is – then and now- based on divisive politics, separating the proverbial “us” from “them.” It is precisely for this reason that modern Republicans so frequently focus on a black-and-white worldview of being “either with us or against us,” and why the vernacular of war and combat is so common among Christian politicians (Wilcox, 1996). Although the modern movement was born in the late 1960s, as late as the mid-1970s both parties could lay some claim to religion; many historians argue that Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976 largely because of Evangelical Christians who supported his theological background (Regnerus, Sikkink, & Smith, 1999). This began to change shortly after the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan to the White House, and by the mid-1980’s the modern Christian Right had gained ascendancy, controlling conservative politics and dividing the country into religious and non-religious voting blocs. In 1992, the rhetoric had become public, as Patrick Buchanan made clear at the Republican National Convention that year, stating in a speech: “My friends, this election is about much more than who gets what. It is about who we are. It is about what we believe. It is about what we stand for as Americans. There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself “(Huang, 2003, p. 44) In case it hadn’t already been clear – language like this served to declare open war between the Religious Right and secularists, especially those within the Democratic Party. Just as in any war, the point of such statements was clear: if you are not on our side – you are the enemy.

This is not to claim that the Christian Right was as singular clearly defined organization; in fact, the opposite is true – both in 1980 and today, members of the Republican Religious Right are diverse and joined together only by a loose collection of shared ideologies. However, what makes this loose organization unique is an almost unprecedented degree of intra-party organization and a willingness to compromise internally in order to defeat the perceived enemy of liberalism, especially on key issues: “As a first approximation, the New Right consists of the network of activists, organizations, and constituencies that have been the most militant opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment, the Panama Canal Treaty, SALT II, affirmative action, federal social programs, and government regulation of business; the most vocal critics of liberalism and “secular humanism”; and the most ardent proponents of the Human Life Amendment, the Family Protection Act, increased defense spending, prayer in public schools, and the teaching of “scientific creationism.” This network of right-wing activity can be divided into three levels: (1) the core activists and their coordinating organizations, who are responsible for welding the New Right into a coherent coalition; (2) the various single-issue and religious groups that constitute the various parts of that coalition; and (3) the constituency that the core activists of the New Right have sought to mobilize” (“The New Christian Right,” 1983, p. 13).

But what makes the Christian Right of today so historically unique – and so potentially dangerous – is its single-minded pursuit of political goals. Although it may seem surprising to many today, this political activity is a historically new phenomenon. “For those who have observed the movement, admirers and critics alike, it comes as something of a shock to learn that this political stance is relatively recent. Predisposed for religious reasons to pay little attention to public affairs, religious conservatives played a surprisingly small part in postwar American politics prior to the 1980s. During that decade, however, they entered the political realm with a will and sometimes with a vengeance, challenging conventional distinctions between religion and politics, as well as those between private and public concerns. Recalling America’s religious roots, reminding their fellow citizens of traditional moral standards, and calling for a revival of public virtue, they sought to reintroduce religious values into American political life. At the same time, in asserting moral and patriotic positions, they saw their faith become more political than ever before. The result was a highly charged hybrid – part religious politics, part political religion–that one writer has called the convergence of “piety, patriotism, and politics” (Lienesch, 1993, p. 139). It is here that the crux of the issue is found: the eager participation of the Christian Right in politics in general, and in Republican politics in particular. In prior eras, two realities served to lessen the potential danger of fundamentalist Christianity: first, members of the evangelical church tended to be found equally in both parties – thus weakening the church’s position of strength within political organizations; and second and more importantly, most religious organizations – prior to 1970 – actively avoided politics. Some pastors and priests argued that it was actually antithetical to Christian teaching; in other cases, it was simply deemed unseemly, or beneath the concerns of the faith. It was not until the late 1970s birth if the Moral Majority, founded by Jerry Falwell, and the Reagan revolution of 1980, that Christian organizations began actively utilizing political means of furthering religious goals (Haberman, 2005). The realization that churches could wield enormous political power led the Christian Right to begin openly advocating “’traditional values’ in public policy by means of mobilizing evangelical Protestants” (Rozell & Wilcox, 1995, p. 2). Unfortunately, few within the Christian Church questioned whether such power should be used – and the modern incestuous relationship between Republicans and the Christian Right is the result.

What is unmistakably clear is that the Christian Right has worked diligently and effectively to advocate their agenda. Beginning during the 1980s, Christian groups began specifically distributing information on political races and candidates. “The Christian Coalition is the largest and most politically savvy of such organizations, having distributed nearly 30 million voter guides or “legislative scorecards” for the 1994 congressional races and 45 million for the 1996 presidential race … Such guides or scorecards typically list candidates’ previous records or avowed positions on issues important to the distributing organization (e.g., school choice vouchers, abortion, welfare reform, term limits), or print candidate responses to the organization’s questionnaires. (Regnerus, Sikkink, D. & Smith, 1999, p. 1377-1378). Critics immediately raised concerns about the legality of this type of open advocacy; it arguably violates a number of church/state separation statutes and may threaten the tax-exempt status of a religious organization, but once the Christian Right discovered their unparalleled power to control the Republican infrastructure, they were reluctant to change course for a simple reason – religious advocacy is remarkably effective. As early as the late 1970s, as the Christian Right was beginning its climb to its current position of power in national Republican politics, a Gallup poll revealed that one out of every three adults questioned had experienced a religious conversion, that almost half believed that the Bible was infallible, and that more than 80 percent considered Jesus Christ to be divine. At the same time, it was revealed that television and radio preachers of that era had an audience of up to 130 million members listening on 130 radio and television stations, with profits approaching $1 billion annually – and this was 30 years ago, before the advent of many modern means of communications that have multiplied these statistics many times over (Lienesch, 1993, p. 1). The success of the Christian Right in monopolizing Republican politics stems largely from the fact that church leaders recognized these realities long before mainstream Republicans, the national media, or secular progressives; they realized the power they could wield long before their political opponents recognized the threat – and it is that realization that allowed them to quickly take control of large segments of the conservative Republican movement (Buss & Herman, 2003, p. 91). By 1995, the Christian Coalition could claim 1.5 million members in 48 states and 1400 local chapters; other conservative groups, like Concerned Women for America, James Dobson’s Focus on the Family, and the Family Research Council – organizations led by leading conservatives like Dobson, Ralph Reed, Tim LaHaye, and Pat Robertson – boasted similar membership numbers, representing a significant religious influence over the voting habits of many tens of millions of Christian Americans (Rozell & Wilcox, 1995, p. 8). The key point here, however, is not that these groups rose to prominence through religious activities – but that they gained power through politics. Each of these groups, and the countless state and local groups with similar religious and political agendas, are linked directly to Republican Party politics. The members of these organizations were not just Evangelical Christians, they were also almost universally voting Republicans who leaned increasingly conservative; more to the point – these organizations had immense influence in guiding the voting patterns of their members, essentially ensuring large voting blocs for Republican candidates (Johnson, Tamney, & Burton, 1990, p. 295).

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the rise of the single-party Christian Right is the fact that organizational leaders are fully aware of their power – and expect explicit quid pro quo arrangements in exchange for the support of their membership. “After the 1994 Republican landslide, Reverend Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition advertised that it had helped to elect a large number of the GOP congressional candidates and therefore claimed the right to promote its version of policy change in the 104th Congress. Taking its cues from the Republican “Contract with America,” the Christian Coalition put forth its own ‘Contract with the American Family’—an agenda of social policies reflecting the goals of many Christian social conservatives. The Christian Coalition and other Christian Right groups have certainly succeeded in getting the rest of the country to listen to their call for social policy reform. News media accounts frequently describe the Christian Coalition’s young executive director Ralph Reed as one of the country’s most influential political operatives. A Time magazine cover story went so far as to tell readers that Reed’s plan of “taking over” the political process was ‘working’”(Rozell & Wilcox, 1995, p. vii). This type of statement clearly illustrates the crux of the issue: by essentially taking over the Republican Party, and by ensuring the votes of its members, Christian conservative organizations have come to expect – and demand – that Republican politicians will follow their agenda once in office. Therein lay the great danger of the current situation, with organized religion in bed with a single political party: religion is no longer simply a spiritual force in public life, but a competing governmental power seeking to advance its own causes through public action and governmental institution of policy. The situation becomes starkly frightening in light of what studies reveal about the psychological propensities of many fundamentalists: some observers note “religious fundamentalists’ orientation toward rightwing authoritarianism, which can lead to higher levels of child abuse; their need for dominance over women; and their motivation for blatantly misreading the First Amendment” (Huang, 2003, p. 45). Thus, while any close ties between religious and political organizations would be troubling, this incestuous bound between Republican conservatives and religious fundamentalism is particularly dangerous.

In short, the great danger of the modern Christian Right is that conservatism and fundamentalism have become largely synonymous – and as a result, religion often governs politics. This reality was not inevitable; conservatism – even social conservatism – does not necessitate a religious component, and certainly does not require a monolithic one-party relationship with evangelical Christianity. Yet this is precisely the modern reality – and a significant number of conservatives now base their politics and their voting patterns on the influence of Christian organizations. A 1999 study of organizational influences on voting habits revealed that 19.9% of Americans had based political votes on Christian Right organizational resources; 48% of evangelicals have used the Christian Right help to some degree. They are also 50% more likely than fundamentalist Protestants to use Christian Coalition-type voting assistance “often.” Some of the other findings were rather surprising: while it is unsurprising that residents in the South and Midwest tended to more heavily turn to the Christian Right for help in assessing candidates and issues, the study also revealed that college-educated people were slightly more likely to be influenced by the Religious Right than non-college s, that women were more heavily influenced than men – and that blacks were more heavily influenced than whites. The most critical finding, of course, was that the most heavily influenced voters were “predictably, Republican voters more than other party voters and nonvoters. (Regnerus, Sikkink & Smith, 1999, p. 1384).

It is not surprising that the Christian Right has gained influence; after all, national polls regularly reveal that 9 out of 10 Americans pray to God routinely; moreover, a full one-third of American are affiliated to some extent with an evangelical denomination (Kaplan, 1993, p. 3) While the active participation in politics is a new phenomenon, the Christian Right has now fully realized its potential impact within the Republican Party – and is taking full advantage of that influence to affect national policy. For example, during the Reagan presidency conservative Christians within the Republican Party began to realize they could use political power to create social change in line with social conservatism: “The Christian Right believed that Reagan’s ascent to the presidency in 1980 signaled the beginning of an age of social conservatism where abortion and pornography would be prohibited, organized prayer returned to the schools, and Christian schools could operate free of IRS harassment” (Haberman, 2005, p. 235). In the 1996 election cycle, although Republican candidate Bob Dole lost his bid for the White House, conservative Christians began to fully exploit their power, to an extent beyond even that which ushered in the Republican Congress in 1994. “29 percent of all voters in 1996 were born-again Christians who frequently attend church. The same poll indicated that 15 percent of all voters claimed to be either members or supporters of the Christian Coalition. Moreover, among those who described themselves this way, fully 67 percent voted for Dole while only 20 percent voted for Clinton. Exit polls revealed a similar story: whites who identified themselves as part of the Religious Right constituted 17 percent of all voters and cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Dole (65 percent to 26 percent for Clinton). Christian Coalition chief Ralph Reed had some basis for saying that “conservative evangelicals were the firewall that prevented a Bob Dole defeat from mushrooming into a meltdown all the way down the ballot” (Penning & Smidt, 1997, p. 37). In short, since 1980 the Christian Right – and the loose coalition of activist organizations – has taken unprecedented steps to infuse its Christian religious agenda with the political goals of the Republican Party, and today is a key constituency of that party; no Republican can easily win national office without the consent of the Religious Right – and they fully expect repayment for their electoral blessings. This not only represents a potential abuse of power on an unimaginable scale – with the separation of church and state almost nullified by the relationship between the Christian Right and the Republican Party – but it has also already led to significant changes in political action and public policy. Specifically, in areas like education, free speech, legislated morality, abortion, taxation, national defense, and the debate over traditional “family values,” the power of the Christian Right within the Republican Party has already had significant, lasting, and damaging consequences for the way in which the nation is governed.

The Christian Right Influence on Education Policy and Child-Raising

There are certain key tenets to the Republican platform that are almost wholly attributable to the role of the Christian Right within the party, and no single area is more heavily impacted than public education. Whenever partisan governance is found, whether at local or national levels, the Christian Right dominates Republican policy in education and child-rearing. For example, “in October 2004, the school board in Dover, Pa., dominated by religious conservatives, made national headlines when it required high school biology teachers to read a statement about intelligent design to students before teaching about evolution … and Dover’s school board is not the first to enact education policy based on its members’ religious views (Deckman, 2006, p. 26). In short, even in local government, where Republicans control local city councils and school boards – it is actually the Christian Right often wielding power. Thus, for all intents and purposes, it is fundamentalist evangelical Christianity that is establishing educational policy for much of the nation’s public schools.

The impact of the Christian Right on child-raising extends even to basic issues of parental choice – like childhood vaccination. A major reason for parental refusal of childhood immunization is religion; some religions – and some individual interpretations of religion – lead many parents to believe immunization violates their faith. These parents believe that God’s will determines the health or sickness of a child, and that immunization violates their trust in God. While the wisdom of such beliefs is arguable, there is no question that the principal of religious opposition to vaccination is relatively significant; in fact, experts note that the two main exceptions to school-mandated immunization are medical or religious. (Mercola, 2003, para. 17). Governmental bodies, at local, state, and federal levels, have taken note of this religious opposition, and in many cases specific exceptions are being made for religious choice in child immunization. Action taken by the state legislature in Missouri provides a clear example of governmental recognition of the religious component of vaccination policy. In that state, House Bill 1538 states specifically that a “parent may exempt a child from immunizations required for school attendance on religious grounds or when immunizations are medically contraindicated.” (“HB-1538,” 2003, para. 1). The Missouri State Senate has followed the example of the lower house, and has passed Senate Bill 112, which specifically allows parents to refuse to vaccinate their children for religious, philosophical, or medical reasons. (“SB-112,” 2003, para. 1). Due primarily to the strength of First Amendment protections of the free exercise of religion, the government has been forced to recognize religious exceptions to immunization mandates, and many parents of various faiths are taking advantage of these policies to exclude their children from vaccination. While the government may hide behind First Amendment policy, the reality is that in most of these cases – Republican dominate state and local government, and thus establish educational and vaccination policies, with the Christian Right once again controlling the party and pulling the strings. Similarly, the issue of school vouchers and home schooling has become, in some jurisdictions, the sole issue upon which votes are cast – with the Christian Right again dominating the debate (Bates, 1991, p. 3). In short, our public schools have become a battleground for the metaphorical soul of the nation – and the Republican Christian Right is using its power in government to focus it’s efforts there, and is succeeding to a large extent:

Where the schools are concerned, the Christian Right may be on a roll. The attitudes of the larger culture and its opinion shapers are showing signs of merging with some of the Christian Right’s longtime pre-occupations with clean living, solid academic grounding, and respect for the family. Nothing obsesses the Religious Right more than getting children off to a strong moral start — a troublesome task under normal conditions and even more so at a time of disintegrating values, order, and social institutions. If, as so many religious conservatives and extremists believe, children are the “inheritors of original sin” and are thus susceptible to indecent temptations, then exposing them to the evils of today’s morally declining schools is risky and possibly calamitous. Sara Diamond, a leading analyst of the Religious Right, puts it bluntly: “The right to determine how and by whom the minds of children are molded is the most valued prize in the tug of war between the Christian Right and secular society.” (Kaplan, 1993, p. 1).

Education is viewed as fundamental to the Christian Right because it represents an opportunity to shape society at its earliest stage, to indoctrinate new future members, and to influence policy; it is solely the role of the Religious Right within the Republican Party that permits it to have this undue influence on such a key part of society.

The Christian Right Influence on the Abortion Debate

The issue of abortion is arguably the most hotly contested debate in the history of American social politics, and despite established Supreme Court precedent declaring the constitutionality of the procedure, the legal and emotional battles are far from over. The politics of abortion is so markedly divisive and polarizing specifically because of the array of factors that are present in any discussion of the issue: biology and feminism, medicine and law, religion and morality. The debate is seldom carried out with any semblance of logic or rational discourse, because the vast majority of activists are motivated primarily by ideological agendas (Baird & Rosenbaum, 1993, p. 41). In her groundbreaking work on the politics of abortion, researcher Kristin Luker concludes that attitudes towards abortion are largely determined by pre-existing ideological attitudes towards sex, motherhood, family and religion; in short, she concludes that abortion viewpoints are formed by ideology rather than logical contemplation. (Luker, 1984). Is this accurate – and has this pre-existing ideology led to the current constitutionality of abortion? Certainly, there is some validity to this position, as evidenced by the undisputed influence of religious and political ideology on abortion beliefs. (Frohock, 1983, p. 29). Obviously, both sides of the abortion issue have their ideologues and dogmatic belief; however, only the Republican Party has a dominant religious constituency – the Christian Right – that pushes an agenda based solely on religious philosophy. As a result, almost all Republican participation in the abortion debate is heavily impacted by fundamentalist, evangelical Christian philosophies. In an issue so fundamental to concerns regarding freedoms and rights to privacy, this intrusion of religion into the public sphere – wholly a result of the intertwining of the Republican Party with the Christian Right – is particularly troublesome and potentially dangerous.

The Christian Right Influence on the Traditional Family Debate

Another critical impact of the Christian Right influence within the Republican Party is the discussion on “traditional family values” and the “natural family,” concepts that are key to Biblical understandings within the evangelical Christian church. For example, Christian conservatives have offered the following Biblical scriptures as proof of the primacy of the nuclear family:

The fact is, the family is the primary agent of stability in a society. It is the family that is charged with the responsibility of infusing children with the principles of God’s law (Deuteronomy 6:6–7). It is the family that is charged with the responsibility of upbraiding, restraining, and rebuking unrighteous behavior (Proverbs 23:13–14). It is the family that is charged with the responsibility of balancing liberty with justice, freedom with responsibility, and license with restriction (Deuteronomy 11: 18–21). It is the family that is charged with the responsibility of being culture’s basic building block (Genesis 9:1–7). The family is central to virtually every societal endeavor under God: from education (Proverbs 22:6) to charity (1 Timothy 5:8), from economics (Deuteronomy 21:17) to spirituality (Ephesians 6:1–4), from the care of the aged (1 Timothy 5:3–13) to the subduing of the earth (Genesis 1:26–28). (1993, 234) (Buss & Herman, 2003, p. 3)

Based on teachings like these, the Christian Right is highly motivated and fully mobilized to influence Republican policy on a wide range of issues, beginning with homosexual marriage but extending to education, abortion, and any and all matters related to the family. This arguably represents the most invasive aspect of the religious monopoly within the Republican Party.

The Source of Evangelical Christian Political Beliefs

To understand the course taken by conservative Republicanism over the last three decades, the unique tenets of fundamentalist Christianity must be understood; it is largely these evangelical beliefs which have led to a modern Republican Party typified by black-and-white us-versus-them thinking, lacking in nuance and depth. Part of this originates from the fact that Christianity is unique among major theological belief systems in that it specifically embraces the concept of oppression and martyrdom. Many Christians expect to deal with religious persecution; many consider it a badge of honor and a sign of faith. This is unsurprising considering the origin of the religion: Jesus Christ was himself persecuted and executed by crucifixion, a Divine submission to human persecution. Before his death, Jesus even specifically blessed those who faced persecution for believing in his Divinity:

Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you. (Matthew 5: 10-12).

Therefore, while the tendency to oppress and persecute different classifications of people is a facet of human nature, the historical persecution of Christians stems primarily from two sources: the unique way in which Christian doctrine tends to threaten the authorities in power, and the specific manner in which the Christian faith places value on martyrdom and submission to persecution.This is arguably the single most repeated and most fundamental message of Christianity: that just as Christ rose from death and ascended to Heaven, all Christians will be rewarded for their sufferings. The Bible specifies a number of responses to persecution, all of which revolve around this basic theme of forgiveness, renewal, faith, and ultimate reward for enduring suffering. In Romans, Christ actually asks his followers to bless their oppressors: “Bless them which persecute you: bless, and curse not.” (Romans 12:14)^[i] The New Testament even goes so far as to suggest the proper response to persecution is not lamentation but rejoicing, because it is a sign of righteousness and an ultimate reward in the afterlife:

Beloved, think it not strange concerning the fiery trial which is to try you, as though some strange thing happened unto you: But rejoice, inasmuch as ye are partakers of Christ’s sufferings; that, when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also with exceeding joy. If ye be reproached for the name of Christ, happy are ye; for the spirit of glory and of God resteth upon you: on their part he is evil spoken of, but on your part he is glorified. (1 Peter 4:12-14)

Why are these beliefs important? The answer is that they serve to create a dichotomy in which political beliefs are based on religious principles of persecution; the Religious Right only advances its agenda by insisting that it is doing battle with the forces of secular oppressors. By creating an external enemy, the Christian Right gains power within the Republican Party – and the Republicans win more elections through this manipulation.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Christian Right control of the Republican Party – at least from a purely theological perspective – is the basic evangelical belief in a coming apocalypse. “The Christian Right as a whole is united in terms of its religious orthodoxy about an inevitable future for the earth. All sections of the movement are convinced that the Second Coming will occur, all non-Christians will disappear one way or another, and Christ will rule the earth. Indeed, this belief is one of the defining features of conservative Christianity and therefore the Christian Right … The earth will then enter the stages of Tribulation—plagued by terrible disasters, floods, fires, earthquakes, wars, and so on. Many millions of people will die horrible, excruciating deaths. At this point, thousands of Jews will see the light and convert (however this is far too late for Rapture and most of them will perish in the disasters and final battles). As regional power blocs engage in war, the Second Temple is rebuilt in Jerusalem: this signals the return of Christ and the saints. (Buss & Herman, 2003, p. 10-11). The problem with such millennial beliefs in Armageddon are obvious: if a single party is dominated by those who believe in the inevitable end of the world and the return of Christ – and a battle with an anti-Christ figure – is that if the Republican Party is in power in national politics, American foreign policy will inevitably be impacted by such a belief. Many experts argue that our current adventures in the Middle East and our long-time policy towards the state of Israel are directly linked to the Republican relationship with the Christian Right.

Conclusions

The Christian Right of today is inextricably linked to the Republican Party, and to a large extent controls the policies established by Republican officials. Whereas the evangelical Christian community was once largely apolitical, it now controls the agenda of a single party, a process that took decades and still continues. “The political agenda of the Christian Right was a long time in coming. It began to take shape in the broadest of terms during the 1960s, in response to such trends as a more intrusive federal government and the rise of the counterculture. It was further molded in the 1970s at the hands of fundamentalist elites, who were able to place their concerns first on the systematic agenda and then on the institutional agenda of the Congress. By the 1980s, the painstaking process of specifying alternatives was underway. It was a slow process, but continuous. The amorphous discontent that existed within the fundamentalist community was given expression, focus, and serious consideration by the early 1980s (Moen, 1989, p. 83).

It is important to note that the critical social issue here is neither conservatism nor fundamentalist Christianity; the issue at stake is the conflation of the two distinct groups into a single parasitical political organism, with one feeding off the other. There is nothing essentially evil about the Christian Right: “With ample justification, the Christian Right’s adherents view themselves as hard-working, taxpaying, law-abiding — if somewhat misunderstood — citizens distinguishable mainly by their unflinching devotion to basic Christian principles” (Kaplan, 1993, p. 2). Instead, the danger represented to society by the Christian Right comes from its dominance of the Republican Party and its infusion of fundamentalist beliefs into the political process:

Buttressed by its rigidly interpreted code of beliefs and disillusioned by what it considers to be the growing futility of public education, the new Christian Right is seeking to position itself as an arbiter or standard-setter of life in education’s household. In the never-ending national conversation about what and how our children are to learn, it has staked out a clear moral stance: its version of true, uncompromising Christian belief, which it defends with primitive ferocity. This “fixation of belief,” as the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce called it, goes to “the heart of what fundamentalism is all about. The fundamentalist temperament tends to search for certainty rather than for error. The fundamentalist’s tendency is to nail his beliefs in place. (Kaplan, 1993, p. 3).

When a single party is dominated by this type of thinking – thinking that is based on religious dogma and which leaves no room for compromise – we are all in danger.

References Cited

Alley, R. (1996). Religious Expression in Public Schools. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Baird, R. M., & Rosenbaum, S. E. (Eds.). (1993). The Ethics of Abortion: Pro-Life vs. Pro-Choice (Revised ed.). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

Bates, V. L. (1991). Lobbying for the Lord: the New Christian Right Home-Schooling Movement and Grassroots Lobbying. Review of Religious Research, 33(1), 3-17.

Buss, D., & Herman, D. (2003). Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deckman, M. M. (2006, October). Governing with the Christian Right: Episodes in Dover, Pa., and Other Districts Might Assuage Administrators’ Fears That a Religious Conservative Board Majority Brings Excessive Entanglement over Religion. School Administrator, 63, 26-29.

Frohock, F. M. (1983). Abortion, a Case Study in Law and Morals. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Gedicks, Frederick Mark, and Roger Hendrix. (1991). Choosing the Dream: The Future of Religion in American Public Life. Ed. Henry Warner Bowden. New York: Greenwood Press.

Haberman, A. (2005). Into the Wilderness: Ronald Reagan, Bob Jones University, and the Political Education of the Christian Right. The Historian, 67(2), 234-239.

“HB 1538 – Immunizations for Students.” (2003). Missouri

State House of Representatives. Available Online at http://www.house.state.mo. Us/bills00/bills00/HB1538.HTM (6 May 2007).

Huang, J. (2003, September/October). The Fundamentals of Extremism: The Christian Right in America. The Humanist, 63, 44-45.

“`Intelligent Design’ and Public Schools: Covert Evangelism?” (May 2002). Church & State: 14.

Johnson, S. D., Tamney, J. B., & Burton, R. (1990). Factors Influencing Vote for a Christian Right Candidate. Review of Religious Research, 31(3), 291-304.

Kaplan, G. R. (1994). Shotgun Wedding: Notes on Public Education’s Encounter with the New Christian Right. Phi Delta Kappan, 75(9), 1-14.

Lienesch, M. (1993). Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Luker, K. (1984). Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lubet, Steven. “The Ten Commandments in Alabama.” Constitutional

Commentary (1998): 471-481.

Mercola, Joseph. (2003). “How to Legally Avoid Unwanted Immunizations of All

Kinds.” Mercola.com. Available Online at: http://www.mercola.com/

article/vaccines/ legally_avoid_shots.htm (9 May 2007).

Moen, M. C. (1989). The Christian Right and Congress. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama.

Moen, M. C. (1992). The Transformation of the Christian Right. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

(1983). The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation (R. C. Liebman & R. Wuthnow, Ed.). New York: Aldine Publishing.

Penning, J. M., & Smidt, C. (1997, January 15). What Coalition? Divisions in the Christian Right. The Christian Century, 114, 37-39.

Regnerus, M. D., Sikkink, D., & Smith, C. (1999). Voting with the Christian Right: Contextual and Individual Patterns of Electoral Influence. Social Forces, 77(4), 1375-1401.

Rozell, M. J. & Wilcox, C. (Eds.). (1995). God at the Grass Roots: The Christian Right in the 1994 Elections. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

“SB 112 – Allows Parents to Refuse to Vaccinate Their Child for Religious, Philosophical,

or Medical reasons.” (2003). Missouri State Senate. Available Online at:

http://www.senate.state.mo.us/03INFO/bills/SB112.htm (8 May 2007).

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Lawmakers Back Family Research Council Effort.” The Washington Times 22 Oct. 1999: 11-12.

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Policy-Making and Social Legislation: Congressional Legislative Involvement in the Gay Marriage Debate

Congress, Policy, Parties, & Institutions

Policy-Making and Social Legislation: Congressional Legislative Involvement in the Gay Marriage Debate

Harvard University – Public Policy

Congress, Policy, Parties, & Institutions –

Policy-Making and Social Legislation: Congressional Legislative Involvement in the Gay Marriage Debate ©

Exploration of the specific legislative processes involved in the formation of public policy, particularly at the federal level, is most effectively accomplished through analysis of single-issue congressional action. While there a myriad of potential choices for analysis, social legislation is arguably more illustrative than fiscal policy or international affairs, because the issues involved are both simpler to define and emotionally and constitutionally polarizing. In recent years, Congress has taken action on a number of social issues ranging from prayer in schools to affirmative; however, the most widely reported recent legislative attempts to manipulate public social policy involve the current debate over gay marriage. By analyzing debate and passage of specific legislation, the congressional processes can be explicitly illustrated.

Understanding exactly how Congress became engaged in the gay marriage debate first requires a fundamental understanding of how Congress functions. Just about every school-age child in the United States learns enough about the workings of the federal government to explain the most basic ways in which the Congress functions. Specifically, it is commonly understood that Congress is a bi-cameral legislature made up of the Senate and House of Representatives, two bodies which together comprise the legislative branch of government – on of the three branches, along with the executive and judicial branches. However, for those who do not work directly within the political arena, the actual manner in which Congress proposes and passes legislation and acts as a check against the unbalanced power of the other federal branches of government is not clearly understood. The reality is that understanding congressional action requires an understanding of the political parties, the committees, the staff, the caucuses, and the way in which Congress interacts with the President.

Political parties are simply groups which work together to advance common political goals, engage in collective fund raising, and serve as focal points for the ideological identities of their candidates. Within the Congress, the two major political parties – the Republicans and Democrats – serve as opposing forces, generally in conflict on certain key ideas. Democrats favor larger government, higher taxes, and more direct governmental involvement in the lives of citizens; Republicans view the federal government as having a much smaller role, and thus favor a smaller government, lower taxes, and less direct government action – preferring to leave power to state and local governments. As the two parties that control congress, each party provides leadership for its members. In the House of Representatives, for example, the senior member of the majority party – which is the Republicans at the moment – is the House Majority Leader; the minority party holds similar minority positions, and there are similar positions in the Senate. These leadership positions are of critical importance in introducing legislation, in leading party membership to either support or oppose legislation, and in controlling the critical committees in both the House and Senate.

The various committees are arguably where the real power is found in Congress, yet they are little understood by most Americans. Basically, there are committees and subcommittees responsible for overseeing large areas of Congressional activities. Examples include the Ways and Means committee, the Budget committee, the Armed Services committee, and the Appropriations committee, although there are dozens more. These committees are so important because they control whether legislation in their area ever reaches the floor for a vote, the pace at which legislation is introduced, and the specific content of that legislation. It is in the committees that deals are struck and changes made – and most legislation that dies before passage does so in the committees, thus control of the key committees is of critical political importance.

Like these committees, the Congressional staff is part of the workings of the government that are rarely discussed and little understood by most citizens. Each Representative and Senator has numerous staffers who provide advice, control access to the elected official, interact with the public and the press, and engage directly in negotiations with other parties and other officials. In short, it is actually the staffers who conduct a great deal of the legislative work. Any elected official who wishes to be effective must have an effective staff, and must understand that he must also form relationships with other Congressional staffers. In effect, the members of Congressional staffs are the soldiers and lieutenants, carrying out the work for their generals – the actual elected officials. As in the military, it is these people who do much of the actual work, although they receive little credit.

The Congressional caucuses are similar in ways to the committees, but they are not formal bodies; instead, they are more informal organizations that are created to facilitate communication and learning between members in regards to very specific issues. For example, one of the best known caucuses is the Congressional Black Caucus, which was created to allow Black Congressman to hold meetings to discuss issues directly related to Black Americans – regardless of the actual party membership of the Congressman. Other caucuses include the Human Rights Caucus, the Health Care Caucus, and the Renewable Energy Caucus. All of these are designed as organizations to allow elected officials with shared concerns on specific issues to address those issues, formulate plans of action, and share new information – all of which may later be used in relevant legislation.

Congressional rules are critical because they control the actual manner in which the Congress functions. Despite the political maneuvers of the parties, the efforts of caucuses, and the decisions of committees, all Congressional action must conform to certain rules. One of the sets of rules that have been discussed in the media recently has been the rules governing filibusters in the Senate. Because these rules can have a dramatic impact on political power, it is significant who controls committees that may be able to change Congressional rules.

Finally, the interactions between the President and the Congress have a great deal to do with the way in which Congress functions. For example, while the President cannot legislate – his office is tasked with executive rather than legislative powers – he can and does introduce legislation that is then voted on by Congress. The most common example of this involves the national budget, which is traditionally presented to the Congress by the President for approval – although the Congress can certainly modify or reject that budget. Perhaps the most important aspect of this relationship is the ability of the President to use his political power to sway votes and encourage or discourage passage of specific legislation.

With this basic level of understanding of legislative fundamentals, specific legislative processes can be highlighted in the way in which Congress has tackled the gay marriage debate. An initial superficial analysis might suggest that the issue of whether homosexual Americans should have full equality in marital rights is of less political and cultural significance than some other issues; after all, marriage and sexuality are fundamentally private spheres rather than public institutions. However, a closer look reveals that the gay marriage issue may, in fact, be the most critical domestic political issue in 21^st century America (Greene, 2005). This is true not necessarily because of the issue itself but because of what it reveals about our society – both culturally and politically. First, from a purely cultural perspective, the gay marriage issue reveals an unprecedented level of conflict between progressives and traditionalists (Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 14). The United States population is sharply divided between the liberal “blue state” and conservative “red state” ideologies – perhaps more sharply on a socio-cultural level than at any time since the Civil War era – and the gay marriage debate highlights this cultural divide better than almost any other issue. The state of Vermont provides a self-evident example: although Vermont is home to former Governor and current Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean, as well as to the nation’s first gay civil-union laws, and is generally considered a progressively liberal state, even in Vermont there is a sharp cultural gap on the issue of gay marriage:

While Vermont is a blue state, it is not immune from the culture wars, and the battle over gay marriage exposed the fault lines between the “two Vermonts.” The first kind of Vermonter has deep roots in the state and with many exceptions, this Vermont tends to be conservative, traditional, and rooted in the values of rural America. The second kind of Vermonter probably is not born in the state and tends to be liberal, nontraditional, and rooted in the ethos of the city. (West, 2004, p. 112).

Vermont serves as an illustrative social and cultural model for the rest of the United States, where the gay marriage issue is even more divisive. Even as civil-union statutes are passed in an increasing number of states and anti-gay marriage legislation is increasingly challenged in the state and federal courts, a significant number of Americans continue to oppose gay marriage – an opposition that seems to be becoming more heated, and is divided sharply along partisan lines. According to a November 2003 poll “by Fox News Channel and Opinion Dynamics, homosexual marriage is opposed by 66 percent of Americans and supported by 25 percent. Respondents also opposed civil unions by a margin of 48 percent to 41 percent. The gap was narrower in a recent Pew Research Center poll, which showed Americans opposing homosexual marriage by a margin of 53 percent to 38 percent. Only 24 percent of Republicans favored the practice, compared with 45 percent of Democrats” (“Gay Marriage,” 2003, p. A1). These numbers reveal not only the cultural and social importance of the issue, but also hint at its true relevance – as a purely political issue. Liberals use 14^th Amendment constitutional arguments to frame the debate as one of civil liberties and equal protection; conversely, conservatives have framed the debate as one of protecting traditional values and the family structure (Shell, 2004). As a result it has become a singularly effective political “wedge issue,” a single issue which many commentators believe may have led to a victory for President Bush in 2004, and which is culminating in debate over Congressional passage of the Federal Marriage Amendment.

Legislative and judicial efforts to specifically define and restrict marriage are not new concepts from a historical perspective. Prior to significant Supreme Court precedents like Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 and Roe v. Wade in 1973, there was essentially no constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy – even over matters like sexual reproduction and marriage (Wardle et al., 2003, p. 29). Even after those and following high Court holding established a constitutional “right to privacy,” cases like the 1984 Bowers v. Hardwick specifically failed to extend those rights to homosexuals, and effectively validated “anti-sodomy” laws (Ireland, 2003, p. 18).

However, when Hardwick was struck down in 2003 by the Supreme Court holding in Lawrence v. Texas, the gay marriage debate became more prominent – and more politically significant. Hawaii and Vermont have legalized some form of gay marriage or legal civil unions and several local jurisdictions have followed suit – raising important issues of states’ rights and federalism; at the same time, several foreign countries, including Spain, the Netherlands, and South Africa, have legalized gay marriage (Greene, 2005, p. 1990). Conservative opponents had attempted to block gay marriage initiatives previously, most notably through the Defense of Marriage Act (DMA), passed in 1996 by a Republican Congress and signed into law by President Clinton (Wardle et al., 2003, p. 4). The DMA was specifically intended to federally supersede state future potential efforts at the state and local levels to recognize gay marriage; several states have actually utilized the DMA Act in their own efforts to prevent acceptance of gay marriage laws originating in states like Hawaii and Vermont:

There is currently a national debate over the right of lesbian and gay couples to enter into state-sanctioned marriage. Much of this debate stems from Vermont’s recent legislation permitting same-sex civil unions. Lawsuits in Hawaii and Alaska attacking the constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex marriage have also fueled the debate. In addition, many states are currently considering, and some have adopted, legislation attempting to prevent recognition of same-sex marriages performed in sister states. Most notably, in 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which could give states that enact such legislation further ammunition in their efforts to deny recognition to same-sex marriages that may be legally sanctioned in sister states. (Greene, 2005, p. 1989).

Unfortunately for social conservatives, recent liberal initiatives have directly undermined the effects of the DMA. Relying on constitutional grounds, liberals and progressives have worked to weaken the effects of Clinton-era anti-gay marriage actions. “When proponents of gay marriage say that existing law is “discriminatory,” and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, their underlying claim is that the state has no legitimate reason for distinguishing between long-term gay relationships and conventional marriages” (Ponnoru, 2006, p. 38). As the courts have seemed increasingly sympathetic to this viewpoint, despite a popular backlash against gay marriage proponents, conservatives have been left with one primary option to prevent gay marriage from becoming a reality: an amendment to the U.S. constitution.

It is precisely for that reason that momentum has been building in attempts to pass a Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), a constitutional amendment that would bar state and local governments from recognizing gay marriage; this would, in effect, sidestep the 14^th Amendment arguments and settle the issue as a matter of law in favor of conservative anti-gay marriage positions. The Bush Administration in general has come out strongly in favor of the proposed FMA Act, as Vice-President Cheney – who is actually opposed to the act – noted in 2004:

But Cheney added that Bush “makes basic policy for the administration” and that the president had endorsed the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment in February because he bellowed some state and federal courts “were making the judgment or the decision [on legalizing same-sex marriage] for the entire country.” (“Cheney,” 2004, p. 14).

President Bush’s support of the FMA Act is certainly understandable for two reasons: first, it conforms to his personal and widely publicized views on the issue, and second, because recent pro-gay marriage activities have led to a significant backlash among the American populace – turning gay marriage into a political winner for Republicans. During the 2004 general elections, fully 12 states passed measures to ban gay marriage, usually by significant margins; even in liberal Oregon, an anti-gay marriage measure passed with a 57% majority of the vote. Nineteen states have now adopted such measures (“Gay Marriage,” 2005, p. A1). The backlash has been so significant that some commentators actually give it credit – or blame – for President Bush’s 2004 re-election victory (Greene, 2005). While that is certainly open to debate, it is unquestionable that President Bush and the Republican Party have effectively seized on the issue as a political tool – and have rushed to support the proposed FMA Act:

Just two days after Gallup released its poll showing the backlash, Bush unexpectedly used a Rose Garden press conference to announce that he’d assigned lawyers to come up with a plan to stop gay marriage. Bush and the Republicans had been under enormous pressure from the Christian right and social conservatives–including National Review and The Weekly Standard–to support a Federal Marriage Amendment to the Constitution, which would ban recognition of any form of marriage between two persons of the same gender. (Ireland, 2003, p. 18).

The Federal Marriage Amendment has had a turbulent legislative history but continues to remain viable because of a significant number of powerful lobbying groups working to advocate for the legislation. Originally drafted by well-known conservative judge Robert Bork and Alliance for Marriage founder Matt Daniels, the FMA Act was initially introduced in the House of Representatives in 2002 by Colorado Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave; after early versions failed in the U.S. Senate, a newer version intended to address Congressional objections, was introduced again in 2004 (Shell, 2004). The new bill, introduced into both the House and Senate as H.J. Res. 106 (108th Congress 2004) and S.J. Res. 40 (108th Congress 2004) – with Colorado Republican Wayne Allard sponsoring the Senate version – reads in full:

Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman. (Greene, 2005).

The Senate version was introduced in January 2005 with 21 co-sponsors signing on; since that time the legislation has remained under consideration by the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution. In November 2005, the subcommittee voted to send the legislation to the full committee, and is now almost certain to re-emerge as an important political issue during the 2006 mid-term elections (McEwan, 2006).

There is a significant amount of influence being wielded by lobbying groups and Political Action Committees (PACs) on both sides of the issue. On the liberal side, groups like Democracy for America, Progressive Democrats for America, MoveOn PAC, and the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund have lobbied heavily to defeat any passage of the FMA Act; on the other side of the issue, numerous groups – many of them religiously-oriented – have worked to push the legislation, with these groups and PACs including most notably the Save Traditional Marriage PAC, a conservative organization created solely to support the FMA Act (Wardle et al., 2003). All of these groups have publicly acknowledged making significant financial contributions to both their respective parties and to key legislators who may be in a position to block or facilitate bringing the FMA Act to a full vote in the House and Senate.

In the final analysis, the ultimate resolution of the gay marriage issue and the status of the FMA Act mirrors a similar debate over abortion legislation; specifically, at issue currently is whether the debate will be solved by the people through their legislators or by the high courts. Even with conservative Bush appointees on the U.S. Supreme Court, the 14^th Amendment arguments in support of gay marriage would appear likely to ultimately defeat most state-sponsored anti-gay marriage legislation; thus, for conservative proponents of the FMA Act, it would seem that a constitutional amendment is indeed the only effective route likely to ultimately serve to ban gay marriage from becoming a political and social reality. Unfortunately for liberals, the current public mood and electoral backlash on the issue suggests that conservatives may have a real chance of – at the very least – getting the FMA to the states for ratification. It is therefore up to progressives and liberals seeking to advance equality across sexual orientation lines to defeat the FMA through direct education of the public in the many basic issues of constitutional equality and fairness; education is the key to defeating knee-jerk conservative social engineering on this issue.

References Cited

Cheney Differs with Bush on Amendment to Ban Gay Marriages. (2004, September 21). The Christian Century, 121, 14.

Gay Marriage Ban Stands. (2005, November 5). The Register-Guard (Eugene, OR), p. A1.

Gay ‘Marriage’ Looms as ‘Wedge’; President Bush Is Clear in Disapproval, but Democrats Face a Delicate Balancing Act. (2003, November 30). The Washington Times, p. A01.

Greene, J. (2005). Divorcing Marriage from Procreation. Yale Law Journal, 114(8), 1989-1995.

Ireland, D. (2003, October 20). Republicans Relaunch the Antigay Culture Wars: The GOP Embrace of Homophobia Is More Than Simply a Sop to the Far Right-Given the Backlash against Gay Marriage, It’s Shrewd Political Strategy. The Nation, 277, 18.

Lisotta, C. (March 2, 2004). The Domino Effect: White House Opposition to Gay Marriage in Massachusetts May Have Set off a Cascade of Antigay State Laws. The Advocate, 13.

McEwan, M. (2006, January 27). GOP to force federal marriage amendment vote in 2006. Available online at: http://rawstory.com/news/2005/Republicans_will_ try_to_bring_Federal_0127.html (24 February 2006).

Murdoch, J., & Price, D. (2001). Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians V. the Supreme Court. New York: Basic Books.

Ponnuru, R. (2005, June 6). Option Four: A Compromise on Gay Marriage. National Review, 57, 38.

Rotello, G., & Graff, E. (1996, June 24). To Have and to Hold: The Case for Gay Marriage. The Nation, 262, 11-13.

Shell, S. M. (2004, Summer). The Liberal Case against Gay Marriage. Public Interest 3-9.

Wardle, L. D., Strasser, M., Duncan, W. C., & Coolidge, D. O. (Eds.). (2003). Marriage and Same-Sex Unions : A Debate. Westport, CT: Praeger.

West, I. (2004). Legalizing Gay Marriage. Argumentation and Advocacy, 41(2), 112-115.

Senior Earns College Degree, High School Diploma

An article about my high school graduation from a local newspaper.

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